Putinism

• 権威主義;
• メディアによる美化を通じて、プーチンを「国民的英雄」として個人崇拝する。 ^{[ 16 ] [ 17 ]}
• 大統領の権力は強大で、^{[ 18 ]}ボリス・エリツィンの時代と比べてもさらに強大になった。^{[ 19 ]}
• 財産に対する国家の強い統制；^{[ 18 ]}
• 「主権民主主義」、つまりプーチンが「混沌とした自由市場の縁故資本主義によって生み出された寡頭政治家」と協力し、彼らが「絶対的な忠誠心」を示すシステム。^{[ 20 ]}
• 縁故主義の要素（協力的なオゼロ）
• シロヴィキ（数十の治安機関に所属する人々で、その多くはプーチン氏が権力を握る前から彼と共に働いていた）への依存。
• 正義の選択的適用、^{[ 21 ] [ 22 ]}法の恣意的適用（「すべては友のため、法は敵のため」）；^{[ 23 ]}
• 比較的自由主義的だが不透明な財政・税制政策。^{[ 2 ]}
• 「手動制御」モード、^{[ 24 ] [ 25 ] [ 26 ]}政治的影響力を持たない弱い技術政府で、国の実質的な支配は大統領府から行われる。^{[ 24 ]}
• 権力の極秘化と舞台裏での重要な決定; ^{[ 24 ]}
• 「民主主義と人権の庇護の下でグローバル化されている」無宗教、「同性婚、過激なフェミニズム、同性愛、大量移民」といった西洋の「退廃」に対する「保守的な抵抗」^{[ 20 ]}
• リベラルなコスモポリタニズムに反対して正統派キリスト教の価値観を受け入れる一方で、ロシア国外の他の反リベラルな極右権威主義者も支持している。^{[ 20 ]}
• 「我々の共通の祖国、大ルーシ」を守るという主張を「窃盗政治の精神的な隠れ蓑」として利用している。^{[ 20 ]}
• 当局が意見表明の自由を嫌うこと、検閲; ^{[ 27 ]}

  

• ロシア正教会聖シノドとの戦略的関係、教会の財産権の保護^{[ 28 ]}、および社会の聖職者化を促進する政策^{[ 29 ] [ 30 ] 。}

  

• ユーラシア主義とは、ロシア文明は「ヨーロッパ」や「アジア」のカテゴリーには属さず、地政学的な概念であるユーラシアに属するため、ロシアは独立した文明であると主張するものである。^{[ 32 ] [ 33 ] [ 34 ]}
• 全ロシア版の超国家主義；^{[ 35 ]}
• In the international arena, Putinism is characterized by nostalgia for Soviet times and a desire to regain the situation before 1989 when the Soviet Union competed on a strong footing with United States in international affairs. Energy is used as an instrument of international politics (so-called "pipeline diplomacy");^[36]
  • In response to the Russo-Ukrainian war, Putinism has been characterised by Western politicians as "authoritarianism, ... imperialism, ... ethno-nationalism."^[37]

• Centralization,^[38] Dutch sociologist Marcel Van Herpen PutinismArchived 19 July 2019 at the Wayback Machine. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; January 2013. ISBN 978-1-137-28281-1 strong presidential power,^[18] weakening of the political influence of regional elites and big business;^[15]
• Establishment of direct or indirect state control over the main television channels of the country, censorship;^[15][39]
• The ever-increasing use of the "administrative resource" (fraud) in elections at the regional and federal levels;^[15][39]
• The actual elimination of the system of separation of powers, the establishment of control over the judicial system;^[15][39]
• Non-public style of political behavior;^[15][39]
• Monopolization of political power in the hands of the president;^[39]
• Priority of state interests over the interests of the individual, restriction of the rights of citizens,^[39][38] reprisals against civil society;^[38]
• Creating an image of a "besieged fortress", equating opposition activities with hostility,^[39] and ousting it from the political field;^[40]
• Putin's personality cult,^[41] the embodiment of state succession in it after a serious injury from the collapse of the Soviet Union;^[40]
• 官僚的権威主義、^{[ 42 ]}支配政党の存在が官僚機構と融合した。^{[ 39 ] [ 42 ]}
• 国家コーポラティズム; ^{[ 42 ] [ 41 ]}
• 財産に対する国家の強い統制；^{[ 18 ]}
• 攻撃的な外交政策（排他的愛国主義）；^{[ 38 ]}
• 秩序と保守的な価値観に焦点を当てる。^{[ 40 ]}
• 国家の偉大さのイデオロギー；^{[ 40 ]}
• 反西洋感情。^{[ 40 ]}

この現象を明らかにした社会学的調査は、2004年にオルガ・クリシュタノフスカヤによって行われ、ロシアの政治エリートにおけるシロヴィクの割合は25%であると結論付けた。^{[ 1 ]}プーチンの「側近グループ」は約20人で構成されているが、シロヴィクの割合は58%に上昇し、議会では18～20%、政府では34%に低下する。^{[ 1 ]}クリシュタノフスカヤによれば、クレムリン官僚機構が「秩序回復」のためにシロヴィクを呼んだような権力掌握はなかった。シロヴィクが権力を握るプロセスは、ボリス・エリツィンの2期目である1996年に始まったとされている。「エリツィン個人ではなく、エリート全体が革命プロセスを止め、権力を固めることを望んでいた。」^{[ 1 ]}

1999年に治安機関出身のウラジーミル・プーチンが首相に任命されたとき、このプロセスは加速した。クリシュタノフスカヤによれば、「確かにプーチンは治安機関出身者を連れてきた。しかし、それだけでは状況を理解するには不十分だ。客観的な側面もある。政治階級全体が彼らの参加を望んでいたのだ。彼らは奉仕のために召集されたのだ…エリート層の観点から見て、国内に秩序を確立できる強力な腕が必要だったのだ。」^{[ 1 ]}

クリシュタノフスカヤは、 KGB /FSBに「関連」する組織で働いていた人々がいたことも指摘している。通常、そのような組織とみなされるのは、ソ連外務省、政府通信委員会、外国貿易省、通信社などである。「そのような機関での仕事自体は、特別な機関との接触を必要とするものではないが、それについて考えさせられる」^{[ 43 ]。}公式および「関連」シロヴィクの数を合計すると、権力者の77%がそのような人物であると推定される^{[ 1 ] 。}

プーチン大統領の国家安全保障担当首席顧問であるニコライ・パトルシェフ氏[ ^{44 ]は}、西側諸国が長年ロシアと宣戦布告なき戦争状態にあると信じており^{[ 45 ]} 、2021年5月に発表されたロシアの国家安全保障戦略の改訂版の立役者であった。この戦略では、ロシアは「ロシア連邦の主権と領土保全を脅かす非友好的な行動を阻止または回避するために、強力な手段を用いる可能​​性がある」と述べられている^{[ 46 ] [ 47 ] 。}

国民投票の後、プーチン大統領が2020年7月3日に大統領令に署名し、改正をロシア憲法に正式に挿入したことで、2020年7月4日に発効した。^{[ 48 ]}ロシアの政治学者、弁護士であり、ユニバーシティ・カレッジ・ロンドンのスラブ・東欧研究学部の名誉上級研究員であるウラジーミル・パストゥホフと、ソ連の反体制派、ジャーナリスト、ロシアの人権擁護者であるアレクサンドル・ポドラビネクは、憲法改正の結果、ロシアは全体主義の特徴を帯びてきていると述べている。これは、公的および私的生活に対する完全な支配の漸進的だが着実かつ攻撃的なプロセス、およびあらゆる反対および反体制の事実上の犯罪化に反映されている。^{[ 49 ] [ 50 ]}

元セクリタテア将軍イオン・ミハイ・パチェパによれば、「ソ連では、KGBは国家の中の国家だった。今や元KGB職員が国家を運営している。彼らは1950年代にKGBに委託された国の6000発の核兵器を管理しており、プーチンによって再国有化された戦略石油産業も管理している。KGBの後継組織はFSBと改名され、国民を電子的に監視し、政治団体を統制し、家や企業を捜索し、連邦政府に潜入し、独自のフロント企業を設立し、事件を捜査し、独自の刑務所制度を運営する権利を依然として持っている。ソ連では、国民428人につきKGB職員が1人いた。プーチンのロシアでは、国民297人につきFSB職員が1人いる。」^{[ 51 ] [ 52 ]}

「ロシア連邦大統領で元外交情報機関職員のウラジーミル・プーチンの下で、チェキストで構成された『FSB国家』が設立され、国内での支配を強化している。その最も近しいパートナーは組織犯罪者である。グローバル化された経済と情報インフラによって特徴づけられる世界において、そして国境を越えたテロ組織が目的を達成し利益を追求するためにあらゆる手段を利用している中で、ロシアの情報機関がこれらの勢力と協力することは、潜在的に破滅的な結果をもたらす可能性がある」と政治学者のジュリー・アンダーソンは述べた。^{[ 8 ]}

元KGB職員のコンスタンチン・プレオブラジェンスキーも同様の考えを持っている。「ロシアでは何人がFSBで働いているのか？」と尋ねられたとき、彼は「国全体だ。FSBはロシア軍やロシア正教会といった教会も含め、すべてを所有している…プーチンはロシアに新しい社会システムを作り出すことに成功した」と答えた。^{[ 53 ]}

「ウラジーミル・プーチンのロシアはヨーロッパでは新しい現象だ。元および現役の治安・情報機関職員によって定義され、支配されている国家だ。ファシスト・イタリア、ナチス・ドイツ、ソ連でさえ、ロシアよりはるかに悪い国家ではあったが、これほど情報機関の人材が上層部に偏っていたことはなかった」と情報専門家のルーエル・マルク・ゲレヒトは語った。^{[ 54 ]}

Andrei Illarionov considers the political system in Russia as a variety of corporatism. According to Illarionov, a former advisor of Vladimir Putin, this is a new socio-political order, "distinct from any seen in our country before". He said that members of the Corporation of Intelligence Service Collaborators took over the entire body of state power, follow an omerta-like behavior code, and "are given instruments conferring power over others – membership "perks", such as the right to carry and use weapons".^[55]

According to Illarionov, this "Corporation has seized key government agencies – the Tax Service, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and the government-controlled mass media – which are now used to advance the interests of [Corporation] members. Through these agencies, every significant resource of the country – security/intelligence, political, economic, informational and financial – is being monopolized in the hands of Corporation members".^[55]

Members of the Corporation created an isolated caste. A former KGB general said that "a Chekist is a breed... A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's siloviki. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged."^[56]

Russian politician Boris Nemtsov and activist Vladimir Kara-Murza defined Putinism in 2004 as "a one party system, censorship, a puppet parliament, ending of an independent judiciary, firm centralization of power and finances, and hypertrophied role of special services and bureaucracy, in particular in relation to business".^[57]

政治アナリストのアンドレイ・ピオントコフスキーは、プーチン主義を「ロシアにおける盗賊資本主義の最高かつ究極の段階」と見なしている。^{[ 58 ]}彼は、「ロシアは腐敗しているわけではない。腐敗とは、ビジネスマンが便宜を図るために役人に多額の賄賂を渡すときに、どの国でも起こることだ。今日のロシアは独特だ。ビジネスマン、政治家、官僚は同一人物だ。彼らは国の富を私有化し、その資金の流れを支配している」と信じている。 ^{[ 59 ]}ロシア系アメリカ人ジャーナリストのマシャ・ゲッセンも、ロシアを「マフィア国家」と表現している。^{[ 60 ]}

政治学者のジュリー・アンダーソンも同様の見解を示しており、彼女は同一人物がロシアの情報機関員であり、組織犯罪者であり、実業家であることもあり得ると述べている。^{[ 8 ]}彼女はまた、元CIA長官のジェームズ・ウールジーの次の言葉を引用した。「私は在任中から、ロシアの組織犯罪、ロシアの情報機関と法執行機関、そしてロシアのビジネスの相互浸透について、ここ数年特に懸念を抱いてきました。私はこの点を、次のような仮説でよく説明してきました。例えば、ジュネーブ湖畔の高級ホテルのレストランで、英語を流暢に話すロシア人と偶然会話をすることになり、彼が3,000ドルのスーツとグッチのローファーを身に着けていて、ロシアの貿易会社の幹部で、合弁事業について話したいと言ってきたら、4つの可能性があります。彼は自分が言っている通りの人物かもしれません。彼は商業的な身分を偽って活動しているロシアの情報機関員かもしれません。彼はロシアの組織犯罪グループの一員かもしれません。しかし、本当に興味深い可能性は、彼がその3つすべてであり、その3つの機関のいずれも、その取り決めに何の問題も感じていないということです。」^{[ 61 ]}

政治アナリストのドミトリ・グリンスキーによれば、「ロシア株式会社、あるいはロシア有限会社という概念は、国家をその並外れた権力に基づいて特別な権利を主張する単なる私設武装集団とみなすロシア流のリバタリアン・アナーキズムに由来する」。「これは、前時代の放浪する盗賊を排除することで安定をもたらす『定住する盗賊』として構想された国家である」。^{[ 6 ]} 2006年4月、税関分野の実質的な民営化は、ビジネスマンと官僚が「歓喜に沸いた」プーチン自身を激怒させた。^{[ 62 ]}

In response to the growing anti-Americanism after the Russo-Georgian War in the Russian intellectual-political class, the director of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements, Boris Kagarlitsky, said, "Ironically, one of the dominant trends here is that we are anti-American because we want to be exactly like America. We are angry that Americans are allowed to invade minor nations and we are not."^[70] In recent Russian polls, the United States and its allies have consistently topped the list of Russia's greatest enemies.^[71][72] However, survey results published by the Levada-Center indicate that, as of August 2018, Russians increasingly viewed the United States positively following the Russia–U.S. summit in Helsinki in July 2018.^[73] According to the Pew Research Center, "57% of Russians ages 18 to 29 see the U.S. favorably, compared with only 15% of Russians ages 50 and older."^[74]

モスクワ・カーネギーセンター所長ドミトリー・トレニンによれば、ロシアにおける反米主義は公式の愛国主義の基盤になりつつある。さらに研究者は、ロシアの支配層は西側諸国に倣い、その公言する価値観を大切にしているふりをやめたと述べている。現在、モスクワは民主主義、人権、国家主権、政府の役割、教会、家族の性質といった分野において、自国の価値観は現代の西側の価値観と完全には一致していないと公然と述べている。^{[ 75 ]}プーチンのロシアは、中国やイランなどの非西側諸国の反米政権と同盟を結んでいる。^{[ 76 ] [ 77 ] [ 78 ]}ロシアの専門家の中には、反米感情は主に国内の政治情勢によって引き起こされており、米国の外交政策とはほとんど関係がないと述べる者もいる。^{[ 79 ]}

専門家は一般的に、プーチンのロシアはファシストではないと考えている。復讐主義や「超男性的権威」など、プーチン主義とファシズムの間にいくつかの類似点があることは指摘しているものの、プーチンのロシアにはファシスト運動の根本的な特徴であった大衆動員と革命的ナショナリズムが欠けていると主張している。 ^{[ 10 ]}さらに、ファシスト運動のように「新しい人間」を創造するための「超越」を求めていない。^{[ 80 ]}その代わりに、プーチンのロシアは一般的に反動的で権威主義的な保守主義であると評されている。^{[ 80 ] [ 10 ]} オックスフォード大学の歴史家ロジャー・グリフィンは、プーチンのロシアを第二次世界大戦時の日本と比較し、プーチンのロシアと同様に「多くの点でファシズムを模倣したが、ファシストではなかった」と述べている。アメリカの歴史家スタンリー・G・ペインは、プーチンの政治体制は「ヒトラーやムッソリーニの革命的で近代化的な体制に似ているというよりは、19世紀のニコライ1世の信条、すなわち『正教、専制政治、民族主義』を強調した信条の復活に近い」と主張した。^{[ 10 ]}

He argued that fascist regimes, imbued with revolutionary ideas and seeking to implement changes which would push society into a new order, relied on the mobilization of the masses of the population and their active participation in politics in order to implement these changes. Putinism, on the other hand, is counter-revolutionary, it strictly opposes any social reforms and social mobilization and it aims to de-politicize society, which it sees as a threat to its existence. The mass social involvement of the population is discouraged, the exercise of politics is reduced to "pure management" which is left to those who are in power, free from the interference of the masses. In exchange for the population's non-involvement in politics, Putinism's social contract offers economic development and an important amount of freedom in private life, "bread and entertainment". According to Sheri Berman, Hitler and Mussolini both came to power through a "very large mass movement" and in front of people, their images as the leaders of the masses and their images as leaders who felt "a sort of direct connection to them stuck in the minds of the people", while Putin's regime "is not a mass regime that came to power or operates on the basis of mass mobilization", on the contrary, Putin "came up as an apparatchik" and has not built "a dynamic and charismatic movement in the fascist style", preferring to see his people de-mobilized and usually best remembered "sitting alone at the end of the table".^[10]

しかし、プーチンのロシアはファシスト的だと主張する人もいる。歴史家のティモシー・スナイダーや他の著者は、ウラジーミル・プーチンが様々な機会に行った演説の中で、一部の観察者によればプーチンにとって大きな思想的インスピレーションとなっている親ファシストの超国家主義者で白人亡命ロシア人哲学者イワン・イリインを引用していることを指摘している。[ 81 ] [ ^{82 ]かつてはユーラシア主義}と保守革命の現代的擁護者でファシズムに近い見解を持つアレクサンドル・ドゥーギンは、プーチン政権の半公式の哲学者となり^{[ 83 ] [ 84 ]} 、2023年に設立されたロシア国立人文大学のイワン・イリイン高等政治学院の学長を務めた。ロシアのジャーナリスト、アンドレイ・マルギンは、プーチンの「失われた」帝国を復活させたいという願望と、教会と「伝統的価値観」への支持を、イタリアのファシスト指導者ベニート・ムッソリーニの政策と比較した。^{[ 85 ]}ロシアの政治学者アンドレイ・ピオントコフスキーは、ラシズムのイデオロギーは多くの点でドイツのファシズム（ナチズム）に似ており、ウラジーミル・プーチン大統領の演説はアドルフ・ヒトラーの考えと似た考えを反映していると主張している。^{[ 86 ] [ 87 ]}ヴァン・ヘルペンは、プーチン政権とワイマール共和国、ムッソリーニのイタリアとの類似点を詳細に比較し、プーチンのロシアに強力なファシスト的要素が存在することを指摘している。しかし、彼はこれらの要素が、ナポレオン3世のフランスのボナパルティズムやシルヴィオ・ベルルスコーニのポストモダン・ポピュリズムに類似した他の要素によって緩和され、彼が「ファシズム・ライト」と呼ぶハイブリッドなシステムを作り出していると主張する。ヴァン・ヘルペンによれば、「プーチン主義」はムッソリーニのファシズムよりも穏やかな顔つきをしているが、超国家主義、軍国主義、新帝国主義の核心は依然として含まれている。^{[ 38 ]}

In 2010, Peter Sucia, an American historian and a contributor to The National Interest, was one of the first publicists to explicitly describe Putin as a leader who is sincerely convinced that his fascist values are righteous. Sucia wrote: "Some historians and economists have noted that fascism is actually an anti-Marxist form of socialism, especially as it favors class collaboration and supports the concept of nationalism — the latter being something that Marxists could never support. A diehard Marxist leader wouldn't get on a plane and fly halfway around the world to try and win support for the Olympics to be hosted in his country, even his hometown. But a tried and true Fascist might do so."^[88]

Professing its own vision of Russian nationalism, primarily based on a predominantly civil understanding of Russian national identity, Putinism has been challenged by the alternative form of Russian nationalism based on ethnic roots. Ethnic nationalists are critical of Putin's immigration policy, which allows migration of millions of people from post-Soviet Central Asia and Caucasus to Russia's traditionally Slavic heartland. Highlighting his stance on "Russia for Russians" slogan in a 2003 television broadcast, Putin said the people who act upon such slogan are "either idiots or provocateurs" who want to weaken the Russian Federation, which he framed as multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country. The law against "extremism" being adopted in 2002 has resulted in closures of many prominent nationalist organizations in Russia, including the Movement Against Illegal Immigration and the Slavic Union.^[89]

According to Robert Horvath of La Trobe University, during the 1990s, when Russia saw waves of racist violence and Putin became president in 2000, his regime exploited this threat to introduce anti-extremism legislation that was also used to target pro-democracy and left-wing activists. The Kremlin's "managed nationalism" would "co-opt and mobilise radical nationalist militants" to fight against the opposition. Afterward, the violent radical nationalists got jailed while others flourished to promote pro-Putin Russian nationalism.^[90] On 25 December 2022, in a TV interview, Putin, apparently for the first time, openly declared that Russia's goal—territorially "to unite the Russian people" (the Russians as ethnic group).^[91]

A number of far-right politicians and parties in the European Union have been linked with Putin, including Marine Le Pen,^[92][93]Matteo Salvini,^[94] and parts of the Alternative for Germany. Putinism has also received support from a number of American far-right figures.^[95][96] Some populists started to distance themselves from Putin after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.^[97][98]

Richard Shorten of the University of Birmingham has stated that Putin "has been appealing, not just for extreme 'manosphere' white supremacists, but also for more 'mainstream' western reactionaries attracted by an unapologetic social conservatism."^[80]Jason Stanley of Yale University argued that Putin was "the leader of Russian Christian nationalism" and "has come to view himself as the global leader of Christian nationalism, and is increasingly regarded as such by Christian nationalists around the world."^[99]

In December 2018, Putin said that "restoration of socialism in Russia is impossible", but stressed that "certain elements of socialization of economy and social sphere are possible". He stated that the restoration of socialism "is always related to expenditures and, eventually, an economic dead end".^[100]

In October 2021, while criticizing the modern "Western agenda", he likened it to that of the Bolsheviks for being based on the advocacy of the "so-called social progress". He criticized the Bolshevik efforts, based on "dogmas of Marx and Engels", to change not just political and economic customs, but also "the very notion of human morality and the foundations of a healthy society". He criticized the Bolsheviks for masquerading as "progress" the "destruction of age-old values, religion and relations between people, up to and including the total rejection of family, encouragement to inform on loved ones", and said that these patterns were repeated in the modern West. He also said: "In a number of Western countries, the debate over men's and women's rights has turned into a perfect phantasmagoria. Look, beware of going where the Bolsheviks once planned to go – not only communalising chickens, but also communalising women. One more step and you will be there" (see Glass of water theory).^[101]

Putin's "on conducting a special military operation" speech has been seen as anti-Bolshevik, in particular for his denunciation of Leninist principles regarding national policy.^[102] However, in his interview to the TV Rain, Russian political scientist Vladimir Pastukhov argued that Putin's regime is based on what he called Russian understanding of communism, what he considered as clinging to Soviet tradition and eclectically uniting Russian nationalist and left-wing ideas, saying that its "missionary ideology of world domination" draws on the Marxist concept of world revolution, even likening Putinism to Trotskyism in this regard.^[103]

In May 2000, The Guardian wrote: "When a band of former Soviet dissidents declared in February that Putinism was nothing short of modernised Stalinism, they were widely dismissed as hysterical prophets of doom. 'Authoritarianism is growing harsher, society is being militarised, the military budget is increasing,' they warned, before calling on the West to 're-examine its attitude towards the Kremlin leadership, to cease indulging it in its barbaric actions, its dismantlement of democracy and suppression of human rights.' In the light of Putin's actions during his first days in power, their warnings have gained an uneasy new resonance".^[104]

In February 2007, Arnold Beichman, a conservative research fellow at the Hoover Institution, wrote in The Washington Times that "Putinism in the 21st century has become as significant a watchword as Stalinism was in the 20th".^[105] Also in 2007, Lionel Beehner, formerly a senior writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, maintained that on Putin's watch nostalgia for Stalin had grown even among young Russians and Russians' neo-Stalinism manifesting itself in several ways.^[106]

In February 2007, responding to a listener's assertion that "Putin had steered the country to Stalinism" and "all entrepreneurs" were being jailed in Russia, the Russian opposition radio host Yevgeniya Albats said: "Come on, this is not true; there is no Stalinism, no concentration camps—thankfully". She went on to say that if citizens of the country would not be critical of what was occurring around them, referring to the "orchestrated, or genuine" calls for the "tsar to stay on", that "could blaze the trail for very ugly things and a very tough regime in our country".^[107]

Neo-Sovietism, sometimes known as neo-Bolshevism, is the Soviet Union-style of policy decisions in some post-Soviet states, as well as a political movement of reviving the Soviet Union in the modern world or to reviving specific aspects of Soviet life based on the nostalgia for the Soviet Union.^[108][109] Some commentators have said that current Russian PresidentVladimir Putin holds many neo-Soviet views, especially concerning law and order and military strategic defense.^[110] According to Pamela Druckerman of The New York Times, an element of neo-Sovietism is that "the government manages civil society, political life and the media".^[111]

The first politically controversial step made by Putin, then the FSB Director, was restoring in June 1999 a memorial plaque to former Soviet leader and KGB director Yuri Andropov on the facade of the building, where the KGB had been headquartered.^[112]

In late 2000, Putin submitted a bill to the State Duma to use the Soviet national anthem as the new Russian national anthem. The Duma voted in favor. The music remained identical, but new lyrics were written by the same author who wrote the Soviet lyrics.^[113]

In September 2003, Putin was quoted as saying: "The Soviet Union is a very complicated page in the history of our peoples. It was heroic and constructive, and it was also tragic. But it is a page that has been turned. It's over, the boat has sailed. Now we need to think about the present and the future of our peoples".^[114]

In February 2004, Putin said: "It is my deep conviction that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a national tragedy on a massive scale. I think the ordinary citizens of the former Soviet Union and the citizens in the post-Soviet space, the CIS countries, have gained nothing from it. On the contrary, people have been faced with a host of problems." He went on to say, "Incidentally, at that period, too, opinions varied, including among the leaders of the Union republics. For example, Nursultan Nazarbayev was categorically opposed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and he said so openly proposing various formulas for preserving the state within the common borders. But, I repeat, all that is in the past. Today we should look at the situation in which we live. One cannot keep looking back and fretting about it: we should look forward".^[115]

In April 2005, during his formal address to Russia's Parliament, President Putin said: "Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself".^[116]

In December 2007, Putin said in the interview to the Time magazine: "Russia is an ancient country with historical, profound traditions and a very powerful moral foundation. And this foundation is a love for the Motherland and patriotism. Patriotism in the best sense of that word. Incidentally, I think that to a certain extent, to a significant extent, this is also attributable to the American people".^[117]

In August 2008, The Economist claimed: "Russia today is ruled by the KGB elite, has a Soviet anthem, servile media, corrupt courts and a rubber-stamping parliament. A new history textbook proclaims that the Soviet Union, although not a democracy, was 'an example for millions of people around the world of the best and fairest society'".^[118]

In November 2008, International Herald Tribune stated:

The Kremlin in the Putin era has often sought to maintain as much sway over the portrayal of history as over the governance of the country. In seeking to restore Russia's standing, Putin and other officials have stoked a nationalism that glorifies Soviet triumphs while playing down or even whitewashing the system's horrors. As a result, throughout Russia, many archives detailing killings, persecution and other such acts committed by the Soviet authorities have become increasingly off-limits. The role of the security services seems especially delicate, perhaps because Putin is a former KGB agent who headed the agency's successor, the FSB, in the late 1990s.^[119]

Putin has an amicable relationship with Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). Roger Boyes considers Putin more of a latter-day Leonid Brezhnev than a clone of Stalin.^[120] In August 2014, he rejected Vladimir Zhirinovsky's proposal to return the Imperial flag and anthem.^[121] On 30 October 2017, Putin opened the Wall of Grief, the first Russian memorial dedicated to the victims of Stalinist repressions. It was seen as a gesture towards the Russian intelligentsia.^[122]

Some hardline Western socialists have been seen as supporting Putin during the war in Ukraine. According to the National Post, as after the collapse of the Soviet Union no socialist state has managed to fully replace it as a socialist rallying point, many hardliners adopted a negative approach to politics defined by the opposition to the United States. Identifying America as the "imperialist core", they have supported the anti-American regimes around the globe under the slogan of "anti-imperialism", including Putin's regime in Russia. This support for Putin exacerbated in the 2010s as Russia regained the strength to challenge American hegemony and was seen as heir to the Soviet legacy, despite the fact that it had transformed into a kleptocracy. It has been also noted that these segments of the international pro-Soviet left have distaste towards the post-Soviet Eastern Europeans states which Putin's Russia has engaged in conflicts with because these countries rejected the Soviet rule as "colonial". National Post identified Canadian Green Partyeco-socialistDimitri Lascaris as one of the representatives of this "pro-Russian socialism".^[123]

Some magazine editors claimed Jean-Luc Mélenchon "supported Russia" and was sympathetic towards Vladimir Putin.^[124][125] Notably, the journalist Nicolas Hénin said that Mélenchon is "on the left of the political spectrum, but is an advocate for the Kremlin leader", with Hénin quoting how Mélenchon is the "political victim number one" after the murder of the Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov.^[126] Cécile Vaissié, author of The Kremlin Networks, considers Jean-Luc Mélenchon as "one of those that approve of Putin",^[127] and Yannick Jadot of EELV said that the "pro-Russia" stance is "contrary to any environment thinking".^[128]

Mélenchon mocked accusations of support for Putin, saying that it is unlikely that an "eco-socialist" would support Putin,^[129] and when attacked by Benoît Hamon on the topic of Putin, he stated: "I am not bound in any way to Mr. Putin. I am absolutely fighting his policy, and if I were Russian, I would not vote for his party, but for the Russian Left Front whose leader is in prison."^[130] However, Mélenchon believes Putin was legitimately elected and thus deserves appropriate respect for his position. Mélenchon declared opposition to Putin's domestic policy and notes his friend of the Russian Left Front, Sergey Udaltsov, is imprisoned in Russia.^{[131][132][133]}

Before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Sahra Wagenknecht was a prominent defender of Russia and its President Vladimir Putin, arguing that while the United States were trying to "conjure up" an invasion of Ukraine, "Russia has in fact no interest in marching into Ukraine".^{[134][135][136]} After Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Wagenknecht said that her judgment had been wrong.^[137][138] Wagenknecht opposed sanctions against Russia over the 2022 invasion, and, in a speech in September 2022, accused the German government of "launching an unprecedented economic war against our most important energy supplier". Before the war, over half of Germany's gas was supplied by Russia. In May, The Left had voted in favor of economic sanctions against Russia. Her speech was applauded by The Left party leadership and by the far-right Alternative for Germany. Her speech prompted the resignation of two high-profile party members.^[139]

On 10 February 2023, Wagenknecht and Alice Schwarzer started collecting signatures for their Manifest für Frieden (lit. 'Manifesto for peace') on Change.org. It called for negotiations with Russia and a halt to arms deliveries to Ukraine. By the end of the month it had received 700,000 signatures. A rally for peace with Wagenknecht and Schwarzer on 25 February was also attended by far-right groups,^[140] and was said to have appealed to the Querfront.^[141]

The Slovak political party Smer holds Russophilic and Eurosceptic stances on foreign policy; however, it claims to support Slovakia's membership in the European Union and NATO. The party expresses strong anti-Western, especially anti-American sentiment, often spreading Russian propaganda narratives.^{[142][143][144]}

Regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War, Smer calls for an end to military aid to Ukraine as well as to sanctions against Russia. It interprets the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a proxy war between the US and Russia, with the latter "dealing with threats to its national interests". The party declares that the conflict was provoked in 2014 by "the extermination of citizens of Russian nationality by Ukrainian fascists".^{[145][146][147]}

In his speech in November 2023, Putin stated that the Mongol-Tatar yoke resulting from the Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus' was better for the Russian people than Western domination, saying: "Alexander Nevsky received a jarlyk [permission] from the khans of the Golden Horde to rule as a prince, primarily so that he could effectively resist the invasion of the West." According to Putin, the decision to submit to the Tatar khans preserved "the Russian people - and later all the peoples living on the territory of our country."^[153]

Some commentators have described Putin as wishing to restore the Russian Empire.^{[154][155][156]} James Krapfl of McGill University has suggested that Putin may be in part inspired by Catherine the Great, stating that "parallels with Putin's strategy are striking."^[157] On 9 June 2022, on the 350th anniversary of the birth of Peter the Great, Putin described the land that had been conquered by Peter in the Great Northern War against Sweden as land being returned to Russia. He also compared the task facing Russia today to that of Peter's.^[158]

Several commentators have also described Putinism as in part an attempt to revive the Russian Empire's doctrine of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality".^[159][160] Faith Hillis of the University of Chicago has argued that Putin "wants to reconstitute the Russian Empire and its guiding ideologies, which were orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality—except now, under the power of a very sophisticated police state."^[161] A 2014 paper in the Journal of Eurasian Studies compares Putin to Emperor Nicholas I, under whose reign the doctrine was instituted, arguing that "Putin has emphasized patriotism, power, and statism to justify centralization of power and authoritarian policies. Putin's policies and rhetoric are strong analogs to those of Nicholas."^[162]

Richard Shorten of the University of Birmingham has stated that "what Putin retains from the Soviet era is not its utopianism but its late-period security obsession."^[80] Tom Parfitt of The Guardian has said that, according to Richard Sakwa, Putin's Soviet patriotism "had little to do with promoting communist values and more to do with besting the enemies surrounding the motherland."^[163]

Putin has made a number of comments referring to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, often blaming it on the creation of federal republics for national minorities within the Soviet Union and on the reforms brought by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late-1980s. In 2005, he referred to it as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century".^[164] In a documentary released in 2021, he referred to it as "a disintegration of historical Russia under the name of the Soviet Union."^[165] In his 2022 "Address concerning the events in Ukraine", he referred to it as the "collapse of the historical Russia".^[166] He has also said: "Anyone who doesn't regret the passing of the Soviet Union has no heart. Anyone who wants it restored has no brains."^[167] On several occasions, Putin has blamed Communist leader Vladimir Lenin for the collapse of the Soviet Union, arguing that his favourable policies toward national minorities in the Soviet Union contributed to destabilize Russia;^[168] in his 2022 speech about Ukraine, Putin went so far to state that "modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia."^[169]

Some commentators have argued these statements show that he wishes to restore the Soviet Union. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine begun, U.S. President Joe Biden stated that Putin "wants to, in fact, reestablish the former Soviet Union. That's what this is about."^[170] That claim has been disputed by many commentators.^[171][172] Mario Kessler of the Centre for Contemporary History has stated that Putin is rather "taking up the imperial desires of tsarist Russia" and that "Lenin's internationalism and Putin's Great Russian chauvinism are, indeed, incompatible".^[173] Cihan Tugal of the University of California, Berkeley has described Putin's view of history as one "where Ukraine and the other nations of the USSR are communist artefacts, and only Russia is real and natural".^[174]Naomi Klein has argued that Putin has been motivated in part by "a desire to overcome the shame of punishing economic shock therapy imposed on Russia at the end of the Cold War".^[175]