In its original form, the TTP had Baitullah Mehsud as its amir. He was followed in the leadership hierarchy by Hafiz Gul Bahadur as naib amir, or deputy. Faqir Mohammed was the third most influential leader.[1] The group contained members from all of FATA's seven tribal agencies as well as several districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), including Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and Malakand.[1] Some 2008 estimates placed the total number of operatives at 30–35,000, although it is difficult to judge the reliability of such estimates.[54]
In the aftermath of Baitullah Mehsud's death, the organization experienced turmoil among its leading militants. By the end of August 2009, however, leading members in the TTP had confirmed Hakimullah Mehsud as its second amir. Government and some TTP sources told the media that Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in January 2010 by injuries sustained during a U.S. drone attack. Unconfirmed reports from Orakzai Agency stated, after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, Malik Noor Jamal, alias Maulana Toofan, had assumed leadership of the TTP until the group determined how to proceed.[88][89]
Senior Afghan analyst Borhan Osman claims that the Pakistan military offensive against the Tehreek-i-Taliban in Federally Administered Tribal Areas forced many members of the TTP to flee Pakistan and seek shelter in Afghanistan. Tehreek-i-Talibans were welcomed in Afghanistan and were treated as 'guests' by the Afghan Government and by the local people. Apart from Tehreek-i-Talibans, many other militants groups like Lashkar-e-Islam and other factions of Tehreek-i-Talibans were allowed to live in Afghanistan. Tribal elders and locals from Achin, Nazin and Kot testify that the militants were allowed free movement in the province and treatment in Government run hospitals. When moving outside their hub, they would go unarmed. National Directorate of Security (NDS) wanted them to fight against the Pakistani government and the Afghan Talibans. Initially, only few of them fought against Pakistan and Afghan Talibans. However, that changed after TTP members in Afghanistan changed their allegiance to ISIS-K. Once they pledged allegiance to ISIS-K, they claimed that they were there to fight Afghan Taliban and Pakistan. Because of their Anti-Afghan Taliban and Anti-Pakistan attitude, many locals believed that ISIS-K were a pro-government forces.[143]
Pakistan claims that Afghan intelligence agencies are also involved in the support of TTP.[167] Notably in 2014, a major TTP leader, Latif Mehsud, was caught by U.S. troops in Afghanistan while he was in a convoy escorted by Afghan Intelligence. American forces captured the TTP leader and handed him over to Pakistani authorities. This angered the Afghan President Hamid Karzai, since Mehsud had been recruited for peace talks according to Afghan authorities.[168]
In 2016, Latif Mehsud gave a public video confession during which he claimed that Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies were responsible for supporting the TTP and other militant groups against Pakistan.[169]
Since the Fall of Kabul in 2021, Pakistan has continued to accuse Afghanistan of supporting terrorism. Accusations have been made against the Taliban government for providing ground for destabilising Pakistan. In 2025, Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, DG ISPR, urged Afghanistan not to allow its territory to be used as a base for activities that destabilise Pakistan, emphasising concerns over cross-border militancy. Hafiz Zia Ahmad Takal, spokesperson for Afghanistan's Foreign Ministry, denied the presence of armed groups in the country and asserted that the Islamic Emirate would not permit Afghan soil to be used to threaten neighbouring countries, the region, or the wider world.[170]
In December 2014, after the Peshawar school massacre in which 132 children were killed, the Pakistani authorities again alleged that there was significant proof of Indian support of TTP to destabilise Pakistan and to counter Pakistan's Afghan policy.[171] The Pakistan Army's official spokesman, Major General Asim Bajwa, said in the aftermath of the attack that, "India is funding Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan," adding that "...a banned outfit cannot function on such a big scale unless foreign powers are funding it."[171]
In 2016, Latif Mehsud gave a public video confession during which he claimed that Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies were responsible for supporting the TTP and other militant groups against Pakistan.[169]
The Sindh Home Ministry in November 2015, wrote a letter to the Rangers and Police claiming Taliban had funded terrorist activities in Karachi. According to the letter, RAW funded around Rs 20million for terrorist activities in Karachi. "The funding has been provided to banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat," the letter claimed.[172]
Azam Tariq claimed responsibility for a suicide attack that killed five at the UN's World Food ProgrammeIslamabad offices on 5 October 2009.[178]
The TTP, through Azam Tariq, claimed responsibility for the October 2009 attack on the army's headquarters at Rawalpindi. Tariq told the Associated Press that the attack was carried out by its "Punjabi faction" although the military insisted the attack originated in South Waziristan.[179]
The Pakistani Taliban, as well as the Afghan Taliban, claimed responsibility for the 30 December 2009 attack on Camp Chapman, a base of operations for the CIA, inside Khost Province, Afghanistan. The TTP released a video of Hakimullah Mehsud sitting next to the suicide bomber, Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian national who had been working with the CIA. In the video, al-Balawi states that the attack is in retaliation for the killing of Baitullah Mehsud. Many analysts doubted that the TTP acted alone.[63][64]
In July 2010, the TTP claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in the Mohmand Agency. Two blasts occurred outside a senior government official's office as people gathered to receive relief supplies. As many as 56 people died and at least 100 suffered injuries.[182]
On 4 October 2010 the TTP claimed responsibility for an attack near Islamabad on fuel tankers bound for NATO troops in Afghanistan.[183]
In December 2010, the TTP claimed responsibility for a double suicide bombing upon administrative buildings in the Mohmand district's Ghalalnai village. The blast killed 40–50 people. The purported head of the TTP in Mohmand, Omar Khalid, claimed responsibility in a telephone call with the AFP.[184][185] The military's chief spokesman, Major GeneralAthar Abbas indicated to Al Jazeera that the TTP attackers were based in neighbouring Afghanistan.[186]
In December 2010, the TTP in South Waziristan kidnapped 23 tribesmen who had recently attended meetings with the Pakistani military.[187]
The TTP claimed responsibility for a 15 January 2011 attack on NATO fuel tankers likely bound for the border crossing town of Chaman. Azam Tariq told the AP, "We have assigned our fighters to go after NATO supply tankers wherever in Pakistan."[188]
On 31 January 2011 Azam Tariq, on behalf of the TTP, claimed responsibility of a suicide bombing in Peshawar that targeted police. The blast killed 5 people (3 police and 2 civilians) and injured 11.[189]
On 10 February 2011 the TTP claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at an army compound in Mardan that killed at least 31 people. Azam Tariq told the AFP that the attack was in response to repeated U.S. drone attacks and military incursions in the tribal areas. He also threatened further attacks against "those who protect the Americans".[190][191]
The TTP released a video of the execution of a former ISI officer known as Colonel Imam. The TTP said they had carried out the murder on 17 February 2011. His body was found near Mir Ali, North Waziristan.[192][193][194]
On 8 March 2011 a car bomb explosion at a gas station in Faisalabad killed at least 32 and injured 125. Pakistani Taliban spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan claimed responsibility and stated that the intended target was a nearby ISI office. He said that the attack was in retaliation for the death of a Taliban commander the previous year.[195][196]
A commander within the TTP claimed responsibility for the Bacha Khan University attack, in which at least thirty students and teachers were killed by as yet unidentified gunmen. However, a spokesperson for the Pakistan Taliban denied the group's involvement.[235]
On 20 January 2017. An IED placed in a vegetable crate, exploded at a vegetable market in Parachinar. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility for the explosion. The blast killed at least 25 people and injured at least 87 others.[236]
Tehreek-e Taliban claimed responsibility for an attack on 2 February 2018 in which 11 soldiers, including a captain of the Pakistan Army were killed when a terrorist blew himself up during a volleyball match in Swat valley.
Tehreek-i-Taliban claimed responsibility on 14 February 2018 for an attack in which, their gunmen killed 2 Frontier Constabulary soldiers in Quetta.[237]
On 11 October 2018 a roadside bomb targeted a vehicle belonging to the Pakistani Army in the Ladha Subdivision of South Waziristan, resulted in the deaths of three soldiers and five wounded, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility for the attack.[238]
Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), claimed responsibility for the attack on 27 July 2019, In which Pakistan army said that six of its soldiers were killed when extremists from across the Afghan border opened fire on a patrol in the tribal district of North Waziristan.[239]
Militants of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility for an attack on 18 August 2019 in which least four people were killed and six were wounded in a roadside bomb blast that targeted a vehicle carrying members of a peace committee helping the Pakistani government in its efforts against the Taliban.[240]
On 14 September 2019, Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, claimed responsibility for the attack an attack on army patrolling party which resulted in the death of one Pakistani soldier. The patrolling party was attacked in Spinwam Subdivision in North Waziristan.[241]
Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, claimed responsibility for an IED blast in Quetta, on 15 November 2019 in which 3 Pakistani soldier were killed.
Hizbul Ahrar, a splinter group from the TTP claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on 4 November 2019, that killed 4 Pakistani soldiers in North Waziristan.[242]
After the 2024 Syrian opposition offensives and the fall of the Assad regime, many videos and pictures circulated online from Syria of Rebel/Jihadist fighters speaking Pashto congratulating the Syrian rebels in person. They were seen referring to the offensives as “jihad against the Rafidhis” and saying things such as “I will kill every Shia I find”. They also referred to Bashar al-Assad's regime as “Rafidhi” and “apostate". It is believed that these individuals are Afghans and Pakistanis who are part of the TTP and had been fighting against Assad and Iran-backed militias in Syria from as far back as 2013.[270]
↑Pashto: تحریکِ طالبان پاکستان, lit.'Taliban Movement of Pakistan'; also transliterated as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.
↑Means "the Khariji trial". The term Kharijites is often used by modern mainstream Muslims to describe Islamist extremist groups that have been compared to the Kharijites for their radical ideology and militancy. The Arabic word fitna means "trial", "conflict", "calamity" or "torment".
References
12345678Abbas, Hassan (January 2008). "A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan". CTC Sentinel. 1 (2). West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center: 1–4. Archived from the original on 1 January 2017. Retrieved 8 November 2008.
12"Hakeemullah announced new leader – doubts linger". Dawn News. 23 August 2009. Archived from the original on 26 August 2009. Retrieved 23 August 2009.
12Khan, Hasbanullah (23 August 2009). "Hakeemullah appointed Baitullah's 'successor'". Daily Times. Archived from the original on 9 November 2009. Retrieved 24 August 2009.
↑"Isis ascent in Syria and Iraq weakening Pakistani Taliban". The Guardian. London. 23 October 2014. Archived from the original on 22 October 2014. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
↑Hussain, Abid. "Taliban blame Pakistan after explosions in Kabul, amid outreach to India". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 10 October 2025.
↑"Afghan Taliban reject TTP claim of being a 'branch of IEA'". Dawn. 11 December 2021. Retrieved 9 May 2022. They are not, as an organisation, part of IEA and we don't share the same objectives... The IEA stance is that we do not interfere in other countries' affairs. We do not interfere in Pakistan's affairs.
↑Atyani, Baker; Mehsud, Rehmat (10 December 2021). "Afghan Taliban deny TTP part of movement, call on group to seek peace with Pakistan". Arab News. Retrieved 9 May 2022.
1 2 Sridharan, Vasudevan (2014年12月17日). 「アフガニスタン:アフガニスタンのタリバン、パキスタンの学校虐殺を「非イスラム的」と非難」 . International Business Times . 2018年6月22日のオリジナルからアーカイブ済み。 2014年12月17日取得。
↑ジュストッツィ、アントニオ(2018年8月)。『ホラサンにおけるイスラム国:アフガニスタン、パキスタン、そして新たな中央アジアのジハード』。41 Great Russell Street, London, WC1B 3PL, UK: C. Hurst & Co. pp. 24, 29–30 . ISBN9781849049641。{{cite book}}: CS1メンテナンス: 場所 (リンク)
↑ジュストッツィ、アントニオ(2018年8月)。『ホラサンにおけるイスラム国:アフガニスタン、パキスタン、そして新たな中央アジアのジハード』。41 Great Russell Street, London, WC1B 3PL, UK: C. Hurst & Co. pp. 29–31 . ISBN9781849049641。{{cite book}}: CS1メンテナンス: 場所 (リンク)
↑ジュストッツィ、アントニオ(2018年8月)。『ホラサンにおけるイスラム国:アフガニスタン、パキスタン、そして新たな中央アジアのジハード』。41 Great Russell Street, London, WC1B 3PL, UK: C. Hurst & Co. p. 30. ISBN9781849049641。{{cite book}}: CS1メンテナンス: 場所 (リンク)
↑ジュストッツィ、アントニオ(2018年8月)。『ホラサンにおけるイスラム国:アフガニスタン、パキスタン、そして新たな中央アジアのジハード』。41 Great Russell Street, London, WC1B 3PL, UK: C. Hurst & Co. pp. 27–31 . ISBN9781849049641。{{cite book}}: CS1メンテナンス: 場所 (リンク)
↑ジュストッツィ、アントニオ(2018年8月)。『ホラサンにおけるイスラム国:アフガニスタン、パキスタン、そして新たな中央アジアのジハード』。41 Great Russell Street, London, WC1B 3PL, UK: C. Hurst & Co. p. 30. ISBN9781849049641。{{cite book}}: CS1メンテナンス: 場所 (リンク)
↑ジュストッツィ、アントニオ(2018年8月)。『ホラサンにおけるイスラム国:アフガニスタン、パキスタン、そして新たな中央アジアのジハード』。41 Great Russell Street, London, WC1B 3PL, UK: C. Hurst & Co. p. 31. ISBN9781849049641。{{cite book}}: CS1メンテナンス: 場所 (リンク)
1 2 3 Pew Research Center (2009年8月13日).パキスタンの世論:過激主義への懸念の高まり、米国に対する不満の継続Pew Global Attitudes Project. pp. 9–10. PDF . 2025年6月19日にアーカイブ済み。
1 2 Shinwari, Naveed Ahmad (2012). Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Volume IV (PDF) (Report). Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP). pp. 68–69 . 2024年5月29日にオリジナル(PDF)からアーカイブ済み。