Article Three of the United States Constitution

Article III authorizes one Supreme Court, but does not set the number of justices that must be appointed to it. Article One, Section 3, Clause 6 refers to a "chief justice" (who shall preside over the impeachment trial of the president of the United States). After the Judiciary Act of 1869, the number of justices has been fixed at nine: one chief justice, and eight associate justices.^[4]

Proposals have been made at various times for organizing the Supreme Court into separate panels; none garnered wide support, and thus the constitutionality of such a division is unknown. In a 1937 letter to Senator Burton Wheeler during the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill debate, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote, "the Constitution does not appear to authorize two or more Supreme Courts functioning in effect as separate courts."^[5]

The Supreme Court is the only federal court that is explicitly established by the Constitution. During the Constitutional Convention, a proposal was made for the Supreme Court to be the only federal court, having both original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. This proposal was rejected in favor of the provision that exists today. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as enabling Congress to create inferior (i.e., lower) courts under both Article III, Section 1, and Article I, Section 8. The Article III courts, which are also known as "constitutional courts", were first created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, and are the only courts with judicial power. Article I courts, which are also known as "legislative courts", consist of regulatory agencies, such as the United States Tax Court.

特定の種類の事件では、合衆国憲法第3条裁判所は、合衆国憲法第1条裁判所に対する上訴管轄権を行使することができる。マレーの借主対ホボケン土地改良会社事件（59 U.S. (18 How. ) 272 (1856)）において、最高裁判所は、「公の権利に関わる法的問題の中には、司法権が対処できるような形で提示されるものがあり、合衆国憲法第3条裁判所による審査の対象となるものもある」と判示した。その後、Ex parte Bakelite Corp.事件（279 U.S. 438 (1929)）において、最高裁判所は、合衆国憲法第1条裁判所は、「政府と他者との間で生じる様々な問題のうち、その性質上司法判断を必要としないものの、司法判断の対象となるものを審査し、決定するための特別裁判所として設置することができる」と宣言した。^{[ 5 ]}破産事件などの他の事件は、司法判断を伴わないと判断されており、したがって合衆国憲法第1条裁判所に持ち込まれる可能性がある。同様に、連邦議会の専属管轄下にあるコロンビア特別区のいくつかの裁判所は、第3条裁判所ではなく第1条裁判所である。この条項は、1966年にリンドン・B・ジョンソン大統領が署名した連邦法89-571（80 Stat. 764）によって、プエルトリコ地区連邦地方裁判所に明示的に適用された。これにより、1900年に設立されたプエルトリコの第4条に基づく米国領土裁判所は、第3条に基づく連邦司法地区裁判所へと変更された。米国の軍事裁判官と移民裁判官も、第3条裁判所の一部ではない。

1937年の司法手続き改革法案（しばしば裁判所増員計画と呼ばれる）^{[ 6 ]}は、フランクリン・D・ルーズベルト大統領が1936年の大統領選挙での勝利直後に提案した、最高裁判所の判事を増員するための立法措置であった。この法案は、連邦裁判所制度全体を改革し近代化することを主な目的としていたが、その中心的かつ最も物議を醸した条項は、大統領が70歳以上の現職判事1人につき1人、最大6人まで最高裁判所に判事を任命する権限を与えるというものであった。 ^{[ 7 ]}

憲法は、廃止された裁判所の裁判官については何も規定していない。1801年の司法法は、連邦党のジョン・アダムズ大統領がトーマス・ジェファーソン大統領就任前に多数の連邦党員判事を任命できるように、裁判所の数を増やした。ジェファーソンが大統領に就任すると、議会はこれらの裁判所のいくつかを廃止し、それらの裁判所の裁判官については何の規定も設けなかった。1911年の司法法典は巡回裁判を廃止し、巡回裁判所の権限と管轄権を地方裁判所に移管した。

憲法は、裁判官は「善行の間、その職にとどまる」と規定している。「善行」という用語は、裁判官は自主的に辞任または退職することはできるものの、残りの生涯にわたって職務を遂行できるという意味に解釈されている。裁判官は、弾劾と議会の投票による有罪判決によって罷免されることもある（そのため「善行」という用語が使われる）。これはこれまでに14回発生している。他の3人の裁判官^{[ 8 ]}、マーク・W・デラヘイ^{[ 9 ]} 、ジョージ・W・イングリッシュ[10]、^{サミュエル・B}・ケント^{[ 11 ]}は、弾劾手続きを経るよりも辞任することを選んだ。

裁判官の報酬は、在任中は増額されることはあっても減額されることはない。ただし、議会は、約束された将来の増額が発効する前に変更することができる。したがって、United States v. Will 事件において、裁判所は、議会は連邦裁判官の報酬に対する年間の生活費増額に関する法令で定められた計算式を廃止または修正することができるが、増額が発効する前に、議会は特定の増額に関して行動を起こさなければならないと判示した。^{[ 12 ]}

Clause 1 of Section 2 authorizes the federal courts to hear actual cases and controversies only. Their judicial power does not extend to cases which are hypothetical, or which are proscribed due to standing, mootness, or ripeness issues. Generally, a case or controversy requires the presence of adverse parties who have a genuine interest at stake in the case. In Muskrat v. United States, 219U.S.346(1911), the Supreme Court denied jurisdiction to cases brought under a statute permitting certain Native Americans to bring suit against the United States to determine the constitutionality of a law allocating tribal lands. Counsel for both sides were to be paid from the federal Treasury. The Supreme Court held that, though the United States was a defendant, the case in question was not an actual controversy; rather, the statute was merely devised to test the constitutionality of a certain type of legislation. Thus the Court's ruling would be nothing more than an advisory opinion; therefore, the court dismissed the suit for failing to present a "case or controversy."

A significant omission is that although Clause 1 provides that federal judicial power shall extend to "the laws of the United States," it does not also provide that it shall extend to the laws of the several or individual states. In turn, the Judiciary Act of 1789 and subsequent acts never granted the U.S. Supreme Court the power to review decisions of state supreme courts on pure issues of state law. It is this silence which tacitly made state supreme courts the final expositors of the common law in their respective states. They were free to diverge from English precedents and from each other on the vast majority of legal issues which had never been made part of federal law by the Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court could do nothing, as it would ultimately concede in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938). By way of contrast, other English-speaking federations like Australia and Canada never adopted the Erie doctrine. That is, their highest courts have always possessed plenary power to impose a uniform nationwide common law upon all lower courts and never adopted the strong American distinction between federal and state common law.

In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2U.S.419(1793), the Supreme Court ruled that Article III, Section 2 abrogated the states' sovereign immunity and authorized federal courts to hear disputes between private citizens and States. This decision was overturned by the Eleventh Amendment, which was passed by the Congress on March 4, 1794, 1 Stat. 402 and ratified by the states on February 7, 1795. It prohibits the federal courts from hearing "any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State".^[13]

第2条第2項は、最高裁判所が大使、公使、領事に関わる事件、および少なくとも1つの州が当事者であるため連邦司法権の対象となる紛争について、第一審管轄権を有することを規定している。最高裁は、合衆国が州と紛争を抱えている場合、後者の要件が満たされると判示している。 ^{[ 14 ] [ 15 ]}その他の事件では、最高裁は上訴管轄権のみを有し、これは議会によって規制される可能性がある。しかし、議会は、マーベリー対マディソン事件、5 U.S. (1 Cranch ) 137 (1803) (司法審査の原則を確立したのと同じ判決) で認められたように、最高裁の第一審管轄権を修正することはできない。マーベリー判決は、議会は最高裁の第一審管轄権を拡大することも制限することもできないと判示した。しかし、最高裁の上訴管轄権は異なる。最高裁の上訴管轄権は、「議会が定める例外および規則の下で」与えられる。この条項により、最高裁判所は1869年に、元南軍兵士が人身保護令状の訴訟を最高裁判所に上訴することはできないと判断した。これは、議会がそのような訴訟を最高裁判所の上訴管轄から除外していたためである（Ex parte McCardle事件）。

裁判所は、管轄権があるかどうかを判断するための予備的な目的で、事件に対してある程度の権限を行使することが多いため、「権限」という言葉は必ずしも「管轄権」という言葉と同義ではない。^{[ 16 ] [ 17 ]}

連邦司法府が法律や条約の 合憲性を審査する権限、または行政規則が法律、条約、または憲法自体と整合しているかどうかを審査する権限は、第2条第2項から部分的に派生した黙示の権限である。^{[ 18 ]}

憲法は連邦司法府が司法審査権を有することを明示的に規定していないが、憲法制定者の多くは、そのような権限は連邦司法府が持つべき適切な権限であると考えていた。アレクサンダー・ハミルトンは『連邦主義者論文集』第78号で次のように書いている。

The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution, is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.^[19]

Hamilton goes on to counterbalance the tone of "judicial supremacists," those demanding that both Congress and the executive are compelled by the Constitution to enforce all court decisions, including those that, in their eyes, or those of the People, violate fundamental American principles:

Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental.^[19] It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise will instead of judgement, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body.^[19]

Marbury v. Madison involved a highly partisan set of circumstances. Though congressional elections were held in November 1800, the newly elected officers did not take power until March. The Federalist Party had lost the elections. In the words of President Thomas Jefferson, the Federalists "retired into the judiciary as a stronghold". In the four months following the elections, the outgoing Congress created several new judgeships, which were filled by President John Adams. In the last-minute rush, however, Federalist secretary of state John Marshall had neglected to deliver 17 of the commissions to their respective appointees. When James Madison took office as Secretary of State, several commissions remained undelivered. Bringing their claims under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the appointees, including William Marbury, petitioned the Supreme Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus, which in English law had been used to force public officials to fulfill their ministerial duties. Here, Madison would be required to deliver the commissions.

Marbury posed a difficult problem for the court, which was then led by Chief Justice John Marshall, the same person who had neglected to deliver the commissions when he was the Secretary of State. If Marshall's court commanded James Madison to deliver the commissions, Madison might ignore the order, thereby indicating the weakness of the court. Similarly, if the court denied William Marbury's request, the court would be seen as weak. Marshall held that appointee Marbury was indeed entitled to his commission. However, Justice Marshall contended that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional, since it purported to grant original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases not involving the States or ambassadors. The ruling thereby established that the federal courts could exercise judicial review over the actions of Congress or the executive branch.

However, Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78, expressed the view that the Courts hold only the power of words, and not the power of compulsion upon those other two branches of government, upon which the Supreme Court is itself dependent. Then in 1820, Thomas Jefferson expressed his deep reservations about the doctrine of judicial review:

You seem ... to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men, and not more so. They have, with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps ... Their power [is] the more dangerous as they are in office for life, and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control. The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves.^[20]

Clause 3 of Section 2 provides that federal crimes, except impeachment cases, must be tried before a jury, unless the defendant waives their right. Also, the trial must be held in the state where the crime was committed. If the crime was not committed in any particular state, then the trial is held in such a place as set forth by the Congress. The United States Senate has the sole power to try impeachment cases.^[21]

Two of the constitutional amendments that comprise the Bill of Rights contain related provisions. The Sixth Amendment enumerates the rights of individuals when facing criminal prosecution and the Seventh Amendment establishes an individual's right to a jury trial in certain civil cases. It also inhibits courts from overturning a jury's findings of fact. The Supreme Court has extended the right to a jury in the Sixth Amendment to individuals facing trial in state courts through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but has refused to do so with the Seventh.