Learning effects: actors may stick with existing institutions because it is costly to learn about procedures and processes in new institutions
Coordination effects: actors may stick with existing institutions because it is too complex to coordinate multiple actors into creating new institutions
Adaptive expectations: actors may expend resources on an institution over another because it is likely to stay or become the dominant institution
These factors entail that actors have devoted resources into developing certain institution-specific skills and are unlikely to expend resources on alternative institutions.[30]
A related crux of historical institutionalism is that temporal sequences matter: outcomes depend upon the timing of exogenous factors (such as inter-state competition or economic crisis) in relation to particular institutional configurations (such as the level of bureaucratic professionalism or degree of state autonomy from class forces). For example, Theda Skocpol suggests that the democratic outcome of the English Civil War was a result of the fact that the comparatively weak English Crown lacked the military capacity to fight the landed upper-class. In contrast, the rise of rapid industrialization and fascism in Prussia when faced with international security threats was because the Prussian state was a “highly bureaucratic and centralized agrarian state” composed by “men closely ties to landed notables”.[31]Thomas Ertman, in his account of state building in medieval and early modern Europe, argues that variations in the type of regime built in Europe during this period can be traced to one macro-international factor and two historical institutional factors. At the macro-structural level, the “timing of the onset of sustained geopolitical competition” created an atmosphere of insecurity that appeared best addressed by consolidating state power. The timing of the onset of competition is critical for Ertman's explanation. States that faced competitive pressures early had to consolidate through patrimonial structures, since the development of modern bureaucratic techniques had not yet arrived. States faced with competitive pressures later on the other hand, could take advantage of advancements in training and knowledge to promote a more technically oriented civil service.[32][33]
↑ Steinmo, Sven (2008). "歴史的制度主義" . Della Porta, Donatella ; Keating, Michael (eds.). 『社会科学におけるアプローチと方法論』 pp. 118–138 . doi : 10.1017/cbo9780511801938.008 . ISBN97805118019382020年3月5日に取得。{{cite book}}:|website=無視されました (ヘルプ)
1 2 3 Voeten, Erik (2019). "国際機関の設計を理解する" . Annual Review of Political Science . 22 (1): 147– 163. doi : 10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-021108 . ISSN 1094-2939 .
↑ Farrell, Henry; Newman, Abraham L. (2010). "グローバル市場の形成:国際政治経済学における歴史的制度主義". Review of International Political Economy . 17 (4): 609–638 . doi : 10.1080/09692291003723672 . ISSN 0969-2290 . S2CID 153647117 .
1 2 Pierson, Paul (2000). "収穫逓増、経路依存性、および政治学の研究". American Political Science Review . 94 (2): 251–267 . doi : 10.2307 /2586011 . hdl : 1814/23648 . ISSN 0003-0554 . JSTOR 2586011. S2CID 154860619 .
↑ Hall, Peter A. ; Taylor, Rosemary CR (1996). "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms" . Political Studies . 44 (5): 936–957 . doi : 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x . hdl : 11858/00-001M-0000-0012-59C1-5 . ISSN 0032-3217 . S2CID 3133316 .
1 2 Farrell, Henry; Finnemore, Martha (2016). Fioretos, Orfeo; Falleti, Tulia G.; Sheingate, Adam (編). Global Institutions without a Global State . Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. doi : 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662814.013.34 . ISBN978-0-19-966281-4。
↑ Mahoney, James; Schensul, Daniel (2006-03-16). "Historical Context and Path Dependence". Oxford Handbooks Online : 454– 471. doi : 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199270439.003.0024 . ISBN0199270430。
↑ Mahoney, James (2000). "歴史社会学における経路依存性". Theory and Society . 29 (4): 507– 548. doi : 10.1023/A:1007113830879 . ISSN 0304-2421 . JSTOR 3108585 . S2CID 145564738 .
↑ Christiansen, Thomas; Verdun, Amy (2020). "欧州統合研究における歴史的制度主義" . Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics . doi : 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.178 . ISBN978-0-19-022863-7。
↑ Hacker, Jacob S.; Pierson, Paul (2014). "After the "Master Theory": Downs, Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis". Perspectives on Politics . 12 (3): 643–662 . doi : 10.1017/s1537592714001637 . ISSN 1537-5927 . S2CID 154841537 .
↑ Bleich, Erik (2018). "歴史的制度主義と司法判断:フランス高等裁判所のヘイトスピーチ判決における思想、制度、行為者" . World Politics . 70 (1): 53– 85. doi : 10.1017/S0043887117000272 . ISSN 0043-8871 . S2CID 158916987 .
↑ Hacker, Jacob S. (2004). "Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States" . The American Political Science Review . 98 (2): 243–260 . doi : 10.1017/S0003055404001121 . ISSN 0003-0554 . JSTOR 4145310 . S2CID 14798241 .
↑ Munck, Gerardo L. (2022). "The Theoretical Foundations of Critical Juncture Research: Critique and Reconstruction" . Critical Junctures and Historical Legacies . Rowman and Littlefield. SSRN 3889801 .
↑ Greif, Avner; Laitin, David D. (2004). "内生的制度変化の理論". American Political Science Review . 98 (4): 633– 652. doi : 10.1017/s0003055404041395 . ISSN 0003-0554 . S2CID 1983672 .
↑ Farrell, Henry; Quiggin, John (2017-06-01). "Consensus, Dissensus, and Economic Ideas: Economic Crisis and the Rise and Fall of Keynesianism" . International Studies Quarterly . 61 (2): 269–283 . doi : 10.1093/isq/sqx010 . ISSN 0020-8833 .
↑ Hall, Peter A. (1993). "政策パラダイム、社会学習、国家:英国における経済政策決定の事例". Comparative Politics . 25 (3): 275–296 . doi : 10.2307/422246 . ISSN 0010-4159 . JSTOR 422246 .
↑ Blyth, Mark (2013). "パラダイムとパラドックス:2つの危機の瞬間における経済思想の政治". Governance . 26 (2): 197–215 . doi : 10.1111/gove.12010 . ISSN 1468-0491 .
↑ Zürn, Michael (2016), "歴史的制度主義と国際関係論―奇妙な組み合わせか?" , Rixen, Thomas; Viola, Lora Anne; Zürn, Michael (編), 『歴史的制度主義と国際関係論』 , Oxford University Press, pp. 199–228 , doi : 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779629.003.0008 , ISBN978-0-19-877962-9