Dominican War of Independence

The Dominican War of Independence (Spanish: Guerra de Independencia Dominicana) was a war of independence that began when the Dominican Republic declared independence from the Republic of Haiti on February 27, 1844 and ended on January 24, 1856. Before the war, the island of Hispaniola had been united for 22 years when the newly independent nation, previously known as the Captaincy General of Santo Domingo, was unified with the Republic of Haiti in 1822. The criollo class within the country overthrew the Spanish crown in 1821 before unifying with Haiti a year later.

The First Dominican Republic was proclaimed at the Puerta de la Misericordia after the blunderbluss shot by the patrician Matías Ramón Mella in the early morning of February 27, 1844 and by the raising of the tricolor flag at the Puerta del Conde by the patrician Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, both inspired by the ideals of their leader, Juan Pablo Duarte, ending the 22 years of Haitian rule. In response, Charles Rivière-Hérard issued the first Haitian campaign against the Dominicans. Thanks to the efforts of Generals Pedro Santana and Antonio Duvergé, the Haitian column that attacked Azua was successfully defeated. However, Hérard, in his retreat, burned the town of Azua, executing all the prisoners he had taken. In Santiago, the Dominican forces under the command of General José María Imbert and General Fernando Valerio defeated another Haitian army, which in its retreat committed numerous misdeeds, robberies and fires until reaching Haiti.^[2] The first naval battle was fought on April 15, 1844. The result of the battle was that the Dominicans sank three enemy ships, without losing a single one of their own. A second campaign, led by Jean-Louis Pierrot, began after intense border hostilities. In May 1845, President Santana, assisted by General Duvergé and General José Joaquín Puello, defeated the Haitian troops at Estrelleta and Beller, capturing the Haitian squadron in Puerto Plata that had bombarded that town, causing extensive damage. The Haitians were pushed back to Haiti across the Dajabón River.

Several years later, in 1849, Faustin Soulouque, led perhaps the deadliest campaign against the Dominican Republic at the head of an army of 18,000 soldiers, who overwhelmed the Dominican forces, forcing them to retreat. Along the way, the Haitians commited many acts of horrors during the march to the capital. The terror inflicted by the invading Haitian army was such that the inhabitants of the ravaged cities had to take refuge in the city of Santo Domingo in the face of the violence unleashed by the Haitian soldiers. Because of this situation, the Dominican President Manuel Jimenes found himself unsuccessful in his attempt to stop the Haitian invasion and was forced to accept the decision of the Congress of the Republic to call General Santana in the company of General Duvergé to confront the invading army. The two leading commanders, along with General Sánchez and General Mella, were successful in defeating Soulouque's forces, who were pushed back to Haiti after a few weeks. Later that same year, Dominican naval forces bombarded, sacked and burned several villages on the southern and western coasts of Haiti. In 1855, some few years after foreign intervention, Soulouque, who declared himself emperor, invaded the Dominican Republic again with 30,000 soldiers divided into three columns, spreading terror and burning everything in their path.^[1] By January 1856, the Haitians were decisively defeated and forced back across the border by José María Cabral's forces.

In the late 18th century, the island of Hispaniola had been divided into two European colonies: Saint-Domingue in the west, governed by France; and Santo Domingo in the east, governed by Spain, occupying two-thirds of Hispaniola. By the 1790s, large-scale slave rebellions erupted in the western portion of the island, which led to the eventual removal of the French and the independence of Haiti in 1804. Following the independence of Haiti, massive portions of the remaining French population were murdered. France would lose the rest of the island forever in 1809. After this, the eastern portion of the island gradually prepared itself for an eventual separation from Spain. Early attempts of independence by the Dominicans were suppressed by the Spanish, as they regained the eastern side of the island under the Treaty of Paris in 1814.^[3]

At the beginning of the 1800s, the colony of Santo Domingo, which had once been the headquarters of Spanish power in the New World centuries prior, was suffering an economic decline. Spain during this time was embroiled in the Peninsular War in Europe, and other various wars to maintain control of the Americas. With Spain's resources spread among its larger colonies, its Caribbean territories became relatively neglected. This period is referred to as the España Boba era.

The Captaincy General of Santo Domingo had approximately 80,000 inhabitants, with the majority being European descendants and mulattos. For most of its history Santo Domingo had an economy based on mining and cattle ranching. The population in the Spanish colony was significantly lower than the French side of the island, which had a population of nearly one million slaves before the Haitian Revolution.

Santo Domingo was regionally divided with many rival and competing provincial leaders. During this period in time the Spanish crown wielded little to no influence in the colony. Some wealthy cattle ranchers had become rulers, and sought to bring control and order in the southeast of the colony where the "law of machete" ruled the land. On November 9, 1821 the former Captain general in charge of the colony, José Núñez de Cáceres, influenced by all the revolutions that were going on around him, finally decided to overthrow the Spanish government and declared independence from Spanish rule, this would usher in an Ephemeral Independence.

A group of Dominican politicians and military officers^[who?] in the frontier region had expressed interest in uniting the entire island, while they sought power with military support from Haitian officials against their enemies.

Haiti's president, Jean-Pierre Boyer, a mulatto who was seen as an ally promised his full support to the frontier governors, and thus he ceremonially entered the country with around 10,000 soldiers in February 1822, after most of the cities and towns proclaimed their allegiance to Boyer between November 1821 and January 1822.^{[citation needed]} On February 9, 1822, Boyer formally entered the capital city, Santo Domingo, where he was received by Núñez who offered to him the keys of the Palace.^{[citation needed]} Boyer rejected the offer, while saying: "I have not come into this city as a conqueror but by the will of its inhabitants".^{[citation needed]} The island was thus united from "Cape Tiburon to Cape Samana in possession of one government."^{[citation needed]}

Eventually, the Haitian government became extremely unpopular throughout the country. The Dominican population grew increasingly impatient with Haiti's poor management and perceived incompetence, and the heavy taxation that was imposed on their side. The country was hit with a severe economic crisis after having been forced to pay a huge indemnity to France. A debt was accrued by Haiti in order to pay for their own independence from the European nation; this would give rise to many anti-Haitian plots.^{[citation needed]}

In 1838, Juan Pablo Duarte, an educated nationalist, founded a resistance movement called La Trinitaria ("The Trinity") along with Ramón Matías Mella and Francisco del Rosario Sánchez. It was so named because its original nine members had organized themselves into cells of three. The cells went on to recruit as separate organizations, maintaining strict secrecy, with little or no direct contact among themselves, in order to minimize the possibility of detection by the Haitian authorities. Many recruits quickly came to the group, but it was discovered and forced to change its name to La Filantrópica ("The Philanthropic"). The Trinitarios won the loyalty of two Dominican-manned Haitian regiments.^[4]

In 1843, the revolution made a breakthrough: they worked with a liberal Haitian party that overthrew President Jean-Pierre Boyer. However, the Trinitarios'^[5] work in the overthrow gained the attention of Boyer's replacement, Charles Rivière-Hérard. Rivière-Hérard imprisoned some Trinitarios and forced Duarte to leave the island. While gone, Duarte searched for support in Colombia and Venezuela, but was unsuccessful. Upon returning to Haiti, Hérard, a mulatto, faced a rebellion by blacks in Port-au-Prince. The two regiments of Dominicans were among those used by Hérard to suppress the uprising.^[4]

In December 1843, the rebels told Duarte to return since they had to act quickly because they were afraid the Haitians had learned of their insurrection plans. When Duarte had not returned by February, because of illness, the rebels decided to take action anyway with the leadership of Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, Ramón Matías Mella, and Pedro Santana, a wealthy cattle-rancher from El Seibo who commanded a private army of peons who worked on his estates. In January 1844, the manifesto of independence was published in several Dominican cities, which stated the reasons why the Dominican population could no longer remain united with Haiti. A month later, the Trinitarios met clandestinely at the home of Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, and agreed on the plans and date of the uprising, which was an uprising of a revolutionary nature that took control of the walled city of Santo Domingo. From there, the rebel emissaries were dispatched to the various regions of the country, with the clear purpose of making known the decisions made at the meeting.

On February 27, 1844, some 100 Dominicans, lead by Sánchez, took the Ozama Fortress in the capital Santo Domingo. The Haitian garrison was taken by surprise, apparently betrayed by one of its sentinels. Another group of insurgents, led by Mella, reached the Puerta de la Misericordia where he fired the legendary blunderbuss and Sánchez, at tip of Puerta del Conde, immediately raised the new Dominican flag, shouting the national slogan: Dios, Patria Y Libertad (God, Homeland and Freedom). The following day the Haitian garrison surrendered.^[4] As these Haitian troops withdrew to the west side of the island, they pillaged and burned.^[4] In retaliation, Dominican gunboats bombarded Haitian ports.^[6] In the days following the proclamation of independence, all Haitian officials left Santo Domingo.

Mella headed the provisional governing junta of the new Dominican Republic. The provisional government quickly organized an army to defend the successful uprising and crush the counteroffensive of the reactionary troops sent from Port-au-Prince. On March 14, Duarte finally returned after recovering from his illness and was greeted in celebration. The population of the new republic stood at approximately 5,200 whites, 135,000 mulattoes, and 34,000 blacks.^[7] The war of independence had now begun.

On March 7, 1844, Haiti's President Hérard ordered a blockade of Dominican ports. Three columns of Haitian troops, totaling 30,000 men, were dispatched on the 10th: one toward Las Caobas under Hérard's command, another towards Neiba, and a third to Santiago and Puerto Plata. General Santana led his cowboys westward. Skirmishes followed,^[8] with Haitian forces winning most but suffering higher casualties. The Dominicans fought with stones, knives, machetes, lances, clubs, and rifles.^[9][10]

After Santana's victory at the Battle of Azua on March 19, he retreated, allowing Hérard's forces to occupy Azua.^[11] The Dominicans shifted their military operations to the Ocoa River and the valleys of Baní, where their cavalry and lancers could effectively operate. This hindered the Haitian advance beyond Azua. The Haitians sustained casualties in their attempts to advance through mountain passes and were repelled.^[12] In the north, heavily outnumbered Dominican troops, under the command of General José María Imbert, defeated Haitian troops led by General Jean-Louis Pierrot at the Battle of Santiago on March 30, thanks to a warning of the pending attack by an Englishman, Stanley Theodore Heneken.^[11] The Haitian column abandoned the field of battle the following day, and during its retreat was harassed, resulting in additional casualties.^[12] Meanwhile, in the south, the Haitian column at Azua, unable to advance and suffering constant casualties, also retreated to Port-au-Prince. As the Haitians retreated, they laid waste to the land.^[11] The Dominicans' effective use of artillery fire on the field of battle enabled them to defeat the Haitians with minimal casualties.^[12]

At sea, the Dominican schooners Maria Chica (3 guns), commanded by Juan Bautista Maggiolo, and the Separación Dominicana (5 guns), commanded by Juan Bautista Cambiaso, defeated a Haitian brigantine Pandora (4 guns) plus schooners Le signifie and La Mouche off the coast of Azua on April 15,^[4] sinking all three enemy ships and killing all the Haitian sailors without losing any of their own ships.

As a result of these successive Haitian defeats, Hérard was ousted on May 3, leading to the temporary suspension of Haitian military operations. Santana's forces captured Santo Domingo on July 12 and proclaimed Santana as the ruler of the Dominican Republic. Consequently, the Trinitarios were ousted from power.

A year later, on June 17, 1845, a small Dominican detachment from Las Matas, under the command of General Antonio Duvergé, invaded Haiti, capturing four enemy trenches and killing over 100 Haitian troops at the cost of only 2 killed.^[13] The invaders captured two towns on the Plateau du Centre and established a bastion at Cachimán.^[14] Haitian President Jean-Louis Pierrot quickly mobilized his army and counterattacked on July 13, resulting in over 200 casualties on the Haitian side, while the Dominican forces were able to repulse the attack without suffering any casualties.^[13] On July 22, the Haitian forces launched another attack on the Dominican stronghold at Fort Cachimán. The Haitians were repulsed after a battle that lasted three and a half hours, in which the Dominicans only suffered seven casualties.^[13] But the arrival of Haitian reinforcements soon compelled the Dominicans to retreat back across the frontier.

On August 6, Pierrot ordered his army to invade the Dominican Republic. A member of La Trinitaria, José María Serra, claimed that over 3,000 Haitian soldiers and less than 20 Dominican militias had been killed at this point.^[15] On September 17, 1845, the Dominicans defeated the Haitian vanguard near the frontier at Estrelleta where the Dominican "square" repulsed, with the use of bayonets, a Haitian cavalry charge.^[4] On September 27, 1845, Dominican General Francisco Antonio Salcedo defeated a Haitian army at the Battle of Beler, a frontier fortification.^[4] Salcedo was supported by Admiral Juan Bautista Cambiaso's squadron of three schooners, which blockaded the Haitian port of Cap-Haïtien.^[16] Among the dead were three Haitian generals. On October 28, other Haitian armies attacked the frontier fort "El Invencible" and were repulsed after five hours of hard fighting.^[4] In a significant naval action between the Hispaniolan rivals, a Dominican squadron captured 3 small Haitian warships and 149 seamen off Puerto Plata on December 21.^[1] On January 1, 1846, Pierrot announced a new campaign. However, on February 27, when he ordered his troops to march against the Dominicans, the Haitian army mutinied, resulting in his overthrow. The war had become highly unpopular in Haiti, therefore, Jean-Baptiste Riché, Pierrot's successor, was unable to organize another invasion.

On March 9, 1849, Haiti's President Faustin Soulouque of Haiti led 10,000 troops in an invasion of the Dominican Republic. The Haitians attacked the Dominican garrison at Las Matas. According to historian Robert L. Scheina, "The demoralized defenders offered almost no resistance and abandoned their weapons." ^[4] The Haitian army continued their campaign against the Dominicans, capturing and burning the town of Azua.^[13] Dominican General (and presidential contender) Santana raised 800 soldiers and, with the help of several gunboats, routed the Haitian invaders at the Battle of Las Carreras on April 21–22. The battle opened with a cannon barrage and devolved into hand-to-hand combat.^[4]

In November 1849, Dominican President Buenaventura Báez launched a naval offensive against Haiti to forestall the threat of another invasion. A Dominican squadron composed of the brigantine 27 de Febrero and schooner Constitución and commanded by Captain Charles J. Fagalde, a Frenchman, appeared off the Haitian coast, taking prizes. On November 4, the squadron bombarded the Haitian village of Anse-à-Pitres and disembarked a landing party, seizing booty.^[17] The next day, the Dominican ships bombarded Les Cayes, captured a schooner and sank some small craft.^[17] Fagalde wanted to sail up the Windward Passage between Haiti and Cuba in search of more prizes. However, the Dominican crews mutinied so Fagalde returned to the port of Santo Domingo.^[17] On November 8, Soulouque declared the Dominicans pirates, but possessing no naval force at that time he could do little else.^[18]

Following a Haitian rejection of a Dominican peace proposal, Báez dispatched a second naval expedition against Haiti. On December 3, the squadron composed of the brigantines 27 de Febrero and General Santana and the schooners Constitución and Las Mercedes and commanded by Juan Alejandro Acosta, bombarded and burned the town of Petit Rivière.^[18] The Dominicans also captured Dame-Marie on the west coast of Haiti, which they plundered and set on fire.^[19]

In 1851, a truce was mediated by the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.^[7] By late 1854, the Hispaniolan nations were at war again. In November, 2 Dominican ships captured a Haitian warship and bombarded two Haitian ports.^[1] In November 1855, Soulouque, having proclaimed himself Emperor Faustin I of a Haitian empire which he hoped to expand to include the Dominican Republic, invaded his neighbor again, this time with an army of 30,000 men marching in three columns.^[1][7] But again the Dominicans proved to be superior soldiers, defeating Soulouque's army, which vastly outnumbered them.

In the south, 4,500 Dominicans led by José María Cabral defeated 12,000 Haitian troops on December 22, 1855, at the Battle of Santomé. The Haitians lost 695 men, including General Antoine Pierrot.^[20] On the same day another force of 400 Dominicans defeated 6,000 Haitian troops at the Battle of Cambronal. The Dominicans achieved a subsequent victory over a Haitian contingent of 6,000 soldiers in Ouanaminthe, resulting in the deaths of over 1,000 Haitians, with numerous others wounded and reported missing during their return to the capital.^[21] On January 27, 1856, some 8,000 Dominicans defeated 22,000 Haitians at the Battle of Sabana Larga near Dajabón after eight hours of fighting which came down to hand-to-hand combat. Thousands of dead or dying were abandoned on the battlefield.^[22] Upon Soulouque's arrival in Port-au-Prince with the remaining remnants of his army, he faced vehement curses from women who had lost their sons, brothers, and husbands in the war.^[21] Nevertheless, he succeeded in securing for Haiti possession of Lascahobas and Hinche.^[23]

As war ravanged throughout the island, the Dominican Republic had successfully disrupted annexation attempts from France and Great Britain, both of which eventually gave up on these plans and had officially recognized Dominican independence in 1850.^[24] A brief scuffle with the United States would halt its plans to expand its control in the Caribbean until some years after the conclusion of the American Civil War. The U.S officially recognized Dominican Republic in 1866.^[25]

Dominican forces were able to defeat another Haitian invasion in 1859,^[7] but the country was in ruins economically and the constant threat of renewed Haitian invasion led Pedro Santana to annex the Dominican Republic to Spain in 1861. The annexation led to a guerrilla war between Dominican nationalists and Spanish forces beginning in 1863. This war resulted in 10,888 Spanish soldiers killed or wounded and another 30,000 dead from yellow fever.^[26] Spain spent over 33 million pesos on the war.^[27] This immense monetary cost, combined with the heavy human toll of the war, led Spain to finally withdraw its forces in 1865. The Dominicans who opposed the Spanish occupation suffered 4,000 dead, while the pro-Spanish militia under Santana suffered 10,000 casualties during the course of the conflict.^[26] The Dominican Restoration War forced Haiti to realize that the goal of conquering the Dominican Republic was unattainable, and it finally recognized its independence in 1867. However, since the border situation was not defined after the conflict, Haiti continued to occupy the central highlands, where the cities of Hincha, Las Caobas, San Miguel de la Atalaya and San Rafael de la Angostura are located. This issue remained unresolved until 1936, when Dominican Republic ended up renouncing these territories to Haiti.

No one has estimated the loss of lives and property incurred during the decades of fighting for independence by the Dominicans against Spain, France, Haiti, and then Spain again.^[28] To this day, the bitterness held by the Dominicans toward the Haitians suggests that during the fighting between them the loss of life and destruction of property were severe.^[29]This would be one of the main sources of tension in the Dominican Republic's relationship with Haiti, which still remains strained to this day.

The creation of the Dominican Republic was an event that had a great impact on the Caribbean. At that time, it was not considered if the new nation had the sufficent capacity to attain its emancipation. According to French clergyman Dominique Georges de Pradt, in his work The Colonies and the Current Revolution of America, (which was a model of political orientation for the independende fighters throughout Latin America in the 19th-century), he states that for a country to achieve its emancipation, it needed to bring together three conditions: increase in population, increase in wealth and increase in education. The Dominican Republic, however, did not meet these three conditions. It emerged as an unstable and impoverished nation with such a small population. John Hogan, an American diplomat who arrived in the country in 1845, reported that the population was 250,000. Navy Lieutenant David Dixon Porter, instructed to carry out an investigation with the purpose of seeing if the Dominican Republic could be recognized as an independent nation, he reported that the number of its inhabitants was 175,000 individuals.^[30]

This quote is more precise than Hogan's, since unlike him, Porter investigated the parish archives. However, in the many years after its independence, the country was still small in population. Mariano Torrente, a Spanish visitor in 1852, estimated the number of inhabitants at 150,000, and in 1860, the Spanish consul in Santo Domingo, Mariano Deal, considered the population to be 186,700 people. The new nation was, in essence, poor in an economic sense. Despite the impressive natural resources, they had not been exploited and energized to generate wealth. Teodoro Stanley Heneken, an Englishman, informed Henry John Temple, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, that the Dominican Republic was born without a shilling in its coffers.^[31]

When studying the process of Dominican independence, which began to take shape by the 1820s, the influences of Pradt's work,^[32] and the pactist ideas of John Locke, in his Essays on Civil Government, and the Declaration of Independence of the United States become apparent. These struggles intertwined into the emancipation process of the Americas that began with the independence of the United States in 1776, continued with that of Haiti in 1804 and concluded with that of Panama in 1903.^{[note 1]} The project of the Independent State of Spanish Haiti barely lasted nine weeks. By the same time, eastern Hispaniola apsired to join Gran Colombia, in accordance with the thought of the Liberator Simón Bolívar of emancipating and uniting the Latin American countries and also the tendency towards union in Central America, as shown in the days preceding December 1, 1821, when the old Central American Provinces were linked into a confederation, except Guatemala, which was integrated, (until 1823), into the First Mexican Empire under Agustín de Iturbide, and El Salvador, which wanted to march alone outside the Hispano-American framework. This trend is perceived in the former Thirteen Colonies and in Haiti itself, when Northern Haiti, (formerly the Kingdom of Haiti under Henri Christophe), integrated with Southern Haiti under the aegis of Boyer. ^[33]

Firearms marked the evolution of the process of National Independence even when it was still in its infancy. However, the firearms available for the defense of the nascent Dominican Republic were scarce and battered. The first clashes with the Haitians, although they ended in victories, took place in extremely disadvantageous conditions from the point of view of the quantity and suitability of the weapons used, which, however, were handled beneficially. Despite their limited numerical presence, rifles and knives supported the Dominican defense. Independence was achieved both with shooting and with machetes.

Firearms marked the evolution of the process of National Independence even when it was still in its infancy: an excited Manuel María Frómeta, while Juan Evangelista Jiménez read out loud the manifesto of September 1843 in Santo Cerro, offered his children as cartridges.^[34] By February 1844, Juan Pablo Duarte's sisters manufactured cartridges, some of which were distributed by his brother Vicente Celestino Duarte in Los Llanos and other towns in the eastern region, and together with his nephews and the help of maids, they turned lead plates used in the linings of ships, which were in their father's warehouse, into bullets.^[35]The very act of initiation of emancipation, the signal given on the night of February 27, 1844 in Santo Domingo was announced by a "discharge of musketry fired into the air,"^[36] according to the French consul Eustache de Juchereau de Saint Denys, which has gone down in history as the blunderbuss shot of Matías Ramón Mella. However, the firearms available for the defense of the nascent Dominican Republic were scarce and in poor condition.

The city's arsenal, "defended only by about sixty poorly armed and ill-disciplined soldiers," easily taken by the National Guard that same night^[37] and formally handed over to the authorities of the new State on February 29 in the presence of Saint Denys,^[38]must have contained only a few pieces, considering that President Charles Rivière-Herárd, during his visit to the eastern part of the island in 1843, "had taken care to empty the State warehouses";^[39] this explains why, within a week of receiving it, the Central Governing Board sent to buy two thousand rifles from Curaçao,^[40] undoubtedly with part of the funds raised from the forced contribution fixed as a result of the total lack of public funds.^[41]

The French representative was able to directly verify the condition of the weapons of the troops that made up the city's garrison, since these were placed in his hands on the occasion of the transfer of command of the square to be returned to the Haitian soldiers "when they returned to their homes,"^[42][43] just as the members of the Central Governing Board had accepted when accepting the bases of the capitulation proposed by the occupying authorities.^[44]

The lack of sufficient weapons in the eastern part of the island to start a movement against the Haitian government was a negative condition recognized since 1843: when on November 15 of that year Vicente Celestino Duarte and Francisco del Rosario Sánchez wrote to Duarte, then in Caracas, they demanded, "even at the cost of a star in the sky," two thousand, one thousand or five hundred rifles; four thousand cartridges; 2 ½ or 3 quintals of gunpowder and “500 lances or as many as you can get.”^[45] Just one month later, Consul André-Nicolas Levasseur, French diplomatic representative in Haiti, and representatives of the eastern part of the island before the Haitian constituent assembly agreed on the guidelines of a protectorate that included the supply by France of “everything that was necessary to establish and consolidate” the future Dominican government, particularly “arms, ammunition for war and for muzzle loading” (…) in sufficient quantity to arm the active part of the population that will be called under the flags of independence.”^[46]

In the "Demonstration of the peoples of the eastern part of the island formerly Hispaniola or Santo Domingo, on the causes of their separation from the Haitian Republic," of January 16, 1844, in a veiled allusion to the so-called Levasseur Plan, it was specified that, in addition to their own resources, "those that could be provided to us in such a case by foreigners" would be used, if necessary.^[47] The foreigners who would provide these resources would be none other than the French, but Chancellor François Guizot, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, did not want to arouse Great Britian's susceptibility(14) and delayed the response of the acceptance of the protectorate agreed with his consul in Port-au-Prince.^[48] However, the development of events^[49] and the confidence in Gallic support led those involved to proclaim the separation on February 27, but with limited weapons.^[50]

The use of rifles in the staged battles and the insistent need for their presence in the Dominican cantons make it clear that bladed weapons were not the only ones that determined the Dominican triumph and that the glorification of the machete by certain authors is more in keeping with its condition as an indispensable instrument of the rural masses,^[51][52] key protagonists of the war^[53][54] and as such indirectly exalted in the reports and communications about the battles, by indicating that the national victories were due, above all, to their steels. For General Radamés Hungría Morell, flintlock rifles and carbines were those that "made possible (...) the maintenance of our independence."^[55] In support of this consideration, it is worth citing the letter of an officer sent to the editors of El Dominicano, after the triumph in Santomé on December 22, 1855, in which he refers to the order of the elements with which a new attack by Faustin Soulouque would be responded to: "If it is true that the barbarian emperor Soulouque is nearby, he will try to return for his honor, something that we all desire in order to dispute who will get hold of that braggart sooner. He has said that he is coming to free us, and from whom and why? This was explained to him with the rifle, the sabre and the lance."(120)

Other authors, however, see the machete as the basis for the patriotic war. Historian Adriano Miguel Tejada maintains that "the Dominican armies (...) without weapons, without supplies, and only with a sharpened machete and the will to triumph, kept the tricolor flag waving on the border."(121) Historian José Miguel Soto Jiménez, on the other hand, despite recognizing that the machete, "within the logic of war, is not and has never been a master weapon, a fundamental or determining tactical element,"(122) points out that in our history it stands as "the primary graphic sign of Dominicanness,"(123) the "symbol of our defense as a nation,"(124) as its companion was "overwhelming and predominant in five centuries of history marked by social turmoil and armed violence."(125) For this author, the machete was "the primary weapon of the soldiers who forged the Republic on the battlefields,"(126) which sowed in the Haitian conscience "a kind of respect for the Dominican people."(127) "ritual" (127) and the backbone of the regular military organization of the First Republic; (128) in short, in his opinion, "Independence was achieved with pure clean machetes." (129)

To the advantage of this position, it cannot be overlooked that the range of our artillery and infantry pieces was limited and that therefore the fighting was at short distances: a muzzle-loading, unrifled, twelve-pound gunpowder cannon, standard piece of the time and called Napoleon for obvious reasons, in optimal conditions could reach 600-700 yards (548.64 m-640.08 meters), penetrate 36 human beings or 8 feet of compacted earth, while a six-pounder would have a range of 300-350 yards (274.32 m-320.04 m), could pass through 19 men or 7 feet of compacted earth (130 ) (in Santiago two 2-pound cannons were used in Fort Libertad, 4-pound cannons in Fort Patria and 8-pound cannons in Fort Dios); (131) the shrapnel, widely used in our defense, according to the manuals French of the time, was to be used when the enemy was 250 yards (228.60 meters) away,(132) while a musket had no effective range greater than 30 meters and 90 meters when used in lines and columns, as was customary at the time; with good training, a unit could fire 3 to 4 musket shots per minute, if logistics and conditions permitted.

These references to the spatial effectiveness of firearms explain why the bladed weapon, while its use drove Haitians into disarray, was given a central place in the popular imagination. The same anonymous author of the letter published in 1855 in El Dominicano says: "Our cowardly and villainous enemies have wanted war and devastation, and they will have war and devastation, cruel as never before. Later, peace will come, when the machete has had its effect."(133) According to the Executive decree on the organization of the army, dated July 15, 1845, the members of the artillery corps would be trained in the handling of both the cannon and the rifle and would have a rifle and a sabre as weapons; the infantry corps would be trained in the handling of the rifle and would have the same weapons, while the cavalry corps would be equipped with sabres, pistols and lances (Art. 28).(134)

Although the members of all the corps carried sabres as complementary weapons - which is explained by their condition as a key piece for various tasks -, (135) the approach of a "tactical school" of the white weapon, which was erected in the pivot of the battles of independence, is questionable. The transfiguration of peasants who used machetes and lances as work tools into skilled masters of their performance as war props is contrasted with the four elements taken into account by the renowned British author John Keegan (136) when determining the state of a troop before and during a battle in the 19th century, namely, fatigue, hunger, smoke and sound. (137) Lic. Virgilio Méndez Amaro, a scholar of the military history of the Dominican Republic, calls this to attention:(138)

First of all, the march of the Haitian and Dominican armies to the battlefields of Santiago and Azua, for example, was carried out in days without pause —its components came from Haiti,139 in the case of the former, and from San Francisco de Macorís, Moca, La Vega and San José de Las Matas and from El Seibo, in the case of the latter—, so their physical condition at the time of the confrontations must not have been satisfactory,140 in addition to the sure lack of knowledge of the terrain by a good part of the troops and officers of both sides.141 Marching from the plains of El Seibo to the dry forests of Azua and from the plains and mountain ranges of Cibao to the semi-arid lands of Santiago, surely also entailed a significant decrease in the capabilities of the soldiers. Modern studies tell us that the average man needs two weeks to adjust to a sudden change in altitude and/or temperature before his effectiveness as a fighter can be restored.

Secondly, little is known about the Creole and Haitian quartermasters during the march towards Santiago and Azua, but it is clear that, at least on the Dominican side, they lived off the land, largely by buying or "requisitioning" whatever provisions they could find, which, together with wild cattle, could sustain part of an army, but not all of the soldiers, so it is not difficult to deduce that there were deficiencies in the food supply on both sides.(143) Thirdly, it is worth highlighting the effect of smoke on the battlefield in that era of black powder. It is worth noting that its impact was so great that the colorful uniforms that characterized warfare in the 19th century were intended primarily to allow commanders to have an idea of the disposition of their troops over the smoke;(144) even so, it was common for a commanding officer to lose momentary vision of the battlefield and his troops as a result of the "fog"(145) generated by exchanges of musket and artillery fire. Smoke not only limited the vision of the battlefield for all contenders, but this feeling of disorientation caused optical and auditory illusions(146) to be generated that deceived soldiers and officers alike.(147)

Finally, the noise generated not only by the shots of cannons and muskets but also by the snorting of horses, nearby bullets and the orders of sergeants and officers (on both sides, since the distance at which you fought allowed you to hear your enemy), must have been a real madness for someone who was not accustomed to it. (148) To this picture must be added the screams of the wounded and dying on both sides, which could chill the blood of any mortal. Only discipline could prevent the collapse of a line of fire before such a Dantesque spectacle. (149) Under these conditions, it is impossible to understand that the Dominican army had a tactical school of edged weapons, whether machetes or lances, in front of an enemy armed with rifles and muskets.

The first Dominican Government was thus faced with a serious dilemma: the lack of a quick response from France and the support for independence of "resolute, vigorous and enthusiastic men" but "barely armed."^[56] Hence, at the time of ordering the acquisition of rifles in Curaçao, the Central Governing Board reiterated, in its resolution of March 8, 1844, the request made to France in the Levasseur plan for "rifles, war ammunition, ships and the money necessary to sustain its state of defense and, at the same time, the troops that might be needed."(19)

According to Saint Denys, firearms were "rare, very rare" and were sought "everywhere,"^[57] even though the inhabitants of the countryside responded en masse to the organization, defense and propaganda work of the junta.^[58] This suggests that the rural population that came to Santo Domingo to join the nascent army largely lacked them and that their presence in the countryside was not common. The recognition of the Seibanos commanded by Pedro Santana, for example, who arrived in the city on March 5, 1844, (22) was based, according to Saint Denys, not on their practice with firearms but on "their skill in handling horses and lances." (23) Haitian historian Thomas Madiou corroborates the data by meaning that Santana's men were armed with machetes and wooden lances (24) topped with bayonets or iron tips and that the junta requisitioned "rifles from everywhere, even from private individuals, arming the ranchers of Hato Mayor, El Seibo and Higüey." (25) The number of members of the army that Santana brought from the eastern plains was 600, 1,500 or 2,000 men, (26) although not all received rifles, since Saint Denys specifies that they left "poorly armed" to the front of battle.(27)

Although Historian Francisco Elpidio Beras thinks that the troops of Macorís, Cotuí, La Vega, Moca and Santiago did not lack weapons or ammunition due to the scarcity of news about it,(28) the situation would not be different in the Cibao. In Santiago, despite the fact that Dr. Alejandro Llenas states that the Haitian general Morriset had separate companies of grenadiers, artillery, gendarmerie, police and national guard,(29) a factory of cartridge packs and lances had to be installed in the city under the charge of Colonel Román Franco Bidó(30) and Lieutenant José Desiderio Valverde repaired artillery pieces and prepared war supplies.(31)

The supply of firearms in that town was an elementary issue to confront the Haitians, which, however, did not find a quick response: on March 17, 1844, the colonel of the National Guard, Dionisio Estévez, commander of the Sabaneta border, demanded from El Guanal to the municipality of San José de Las Matas their shipment to be able to march to the canton of Mao: "If you do not send me without delay the necessary weapons and ammunition, we can do nothing." (32) The next day, Estévez wrote again about the delay: "I do not know what to attribute to the fact that they do not send me any weapons and ammunition, because Colonel José Gómez tells me to ask that there is everything." (33)

In San José de Las Matas there were not enough weapons and accessories: on March 11, 1844, the delegate of the Central Governing Board in the Cibao sent money and war supplies from Santiago to that town, among which must have been the packages of cartridges and tin cans full of gunpowder that were received at the town headquarters from the municipal commission on that same date. (34) To arm the garrison of the place, Brigadier General Felipe Vásquez, commander of the districts of Santiago and La Vega, also sent his corregidor and his municipal board packages of cartridges, lances and [rifle] stones and even sent a gunsmith to repair the broken rifles and other weapons; (35) his substitute, General José María Imbert, sent new packages of cartridges days later. (36)

The supply of firearms in that town was an elementary issue to confront the Haitians, who, however, did not find a quick response: on March 17, 1844, the colonel of the National Guard, Dionisio Estévez, commander of the Sabaneta border, demanded from El Guanal to the municipality of San José de Las Matas its shipment to be able to march to the canton of Mao: "If you do not send me without delay the necessary weapons and ammunition, we can do nothing." (37) The next day, Estévez wrote again in response to the delay: "I do not know what to attribute to the fact that they do not send me any weapons and ammunition, since Colonel José Gómez tells me to ask because there is everything." (38) On March 24, the battalion commander Francisco de la Caba, reiterated to the municipality from Sama, canton of Guayubín, the necessary sending of "the aid of men, weapons and ammunition," (39) and three days later, the commander of the battalion ...40) and three days later, the commander of the battalion Francisco de la Caba, reiterated to the municipality from Sama, canton of Guayubín, the necessary sending of "the aid of men, weapons and ammunition," (41) and three days later, the commander of the battalion Francisco de la Caba, reiterated to the municipality from Sama, canton of Guayubín, the necessary sending of "the aid of men, weapons and ammunition," (42) and three days later, the commander of the battalion Francisco de la Caba, reiterated to the municipality from Sama, canton of Guayubín, the necessary sending of "the aid of men, weapons and ammunition," (43) and three days later, the commander of the battalion Francisco de la Caba Then he requested from Cañafístol "some weapons and provisions", to have "the useless rifles repaired" and not to send him "More lances that are of no use to the infantry," the latter, no doubt, given the nature of the terrain and the existence of vegetation that made their use impractical.(40) On March 28, Caba himself asked for, in addition to "a drum with its box for the troops" and "a load of blunt rifles"(41) to "encourage the people in case of a fight," "good rifles together with ammunition."(42)

In Puerto Plata, according to the capitulation agreed upon on March 15, 1844, the only weapons that would not be available would be those of those Haitians who wanted to leave the country; the soldiers would deposit theirs in the arsenal and those in the possession of the civic guard and the troops that formed the garrison of that city would remain in the hands of its members.(43)

In Santo Domingo, since the weapons requested from Curaçao by the Central Governing Board had not yet arrived by March 13, Santana's men left "poorly armed" towards the southern region, as the aforementioned Saint Denys notes; However, the diplomatic official attributed to their “holy enthusiasm” and to the confidence in the justice of their cause the ruin and dispersion that they achieved over the Haitian forces in Azua on March 19 of the following year.(44) Although in the newspaper El eco dominicano of April 25, 1844, the author under the pseudonym “Un dominicano” emphasized that the Dominicans were armed “more with enthusiasm and thirst for revenge than with projectiles”(45) and the Haitian historian Thomas Madiou speaks of the “few Dominican riflemen,”(46) the impetus and self-esteem of the nascent army were not sustained only by their lances: in his letter to Minister Guizot about the military operations in that region, Saint Denys notes that on March 17, the vanguard of a Dominican column, organized “in battle position,” unloaded its weapons in Neyba, and that two days later, in Azua, the cannon pieces loaded with shrapnel and the "Dominican fire" were those that repelled the Haitian attacks.^[59]

The Haitian author Dorvelas Dorval, in his version of the previous clashes, points out that on March 11, “a column of around two hundred men, cavalry and infantry, armed with rifles, lances and swords, took position and attacked our advance”, engaging in “a skirmish” near Neyba(48) —specifically at the Fuente del Rodeo—(49) although he does not offer details of this; on what happened in Azua, he agrees with Saint Denys in the sense that the shrapnel and bullets took care of the Haitian troops.(50) The pseudonymous author already cited from El eco dominicano, recorded that “the cannon, some musketry and the deadly well-handled lance and, above all, the festivity and bonhomie of the troops that did not go into action, made the enemy retreat”.(51)

The courage of the Seibano lancers was not the only factor that supported the defense of Azua, even though Saint Denys himself calls them "the true saviors of the Dominican Revolution" ^[60] and General José Miguel Soto Jiménez highlights the surprise effect of the machete charges (53) that were ordered from their positions by the commanders Lucas Díaz, Juan Esteban Ceara, José del Carmen García (54) and Antonio Duvergé against the two wings of the Haitian army. (55) In this sense, Soto Jiménez himself specifies that although the machete assault of the men commanded by Duvergé completed the total withdrawal of the Haitian army, this action was supported by the riflemen of Nicolás Mañón, stationed in Fort Resolí. (56)

Nor did bladed weapons play the exaggerated role attributed to them in Santiago. In the delaying battle that took place in Escalante, General Francisco Antonio Salcedo reports that we opened fire on the enemies positioned in that place. (57) And already in the savannah of the town, in the battle that took place on March 30, the artillery, with its cannons loaded with shrapnel, and the infantry, "within rifle range," were the ones that defined that warlike encounter, as can be deduced from the reading of the official report of General José María Imbert, (58) even though in that same document it is stated that, in the first phase of the battle - in allusion to the charge of the Andulleros led by the then Captain Fernando Valerio - (59) "ours came to blows with the enemy" and some Haitian soldiers of the infantry column that attacked our left flank, preceded by a cavalry corps, were "killed by our lances and machetes." (60)

In Azua, it was the lack of ammunition, according to the version echoed by Saint Denys, the reason why Santana had to retreat to Baní.^[61]This is confirmed by the fact that, two days before the battle in that town, Santana urged Abraham Cohen to speak with the French consul to "see if there is a possibility of putting at my disposal the French troops that we need to stop the enemy," fearing the non-adherence to the Dominican cause at that time of the inhabitants of Las Matas de Farfán, Hincha and San Juan de la Maguana,^[62] the latter whose pronouncement had been assumed by a cavalry of about sixty men "very poorly armed," according to the testimony of Jacinto de Castro. (63) Although the triumph in Azua led the Central Governing Board to call on the Dominicans to "run to arms, fly to victory, unite to be invincible,"^[63]the insistence of a French armed support did not^[64]On March 29, Tomás Bobadilla and the other members of the Central Governing Board submitted to Saint Denys a request that France offer, until a treaty of friendship and alliance was concluded, "three thousand armed men, three thousand rifles and the same number of cartridges, as well as an open credit to be able to provide in the field the needs already indicated."^[65]

Without French support, the support provided from the capital to the southern expeditionary army was ineffective. Admiral Alphonse de Moges, commander of the French squadron in the waters of the island, commented to Saint Denys on April 1 and 2 that he had heard Santana complain "of not receiving any help in artillery, men and weapons from the citizens who govern Santo Domingo"^[66] and that he was astonished "at the abandonment of the weapons, ammunition and artillery of which he is deprived."^[67] The precariousness of the offensive means was such that, according to Saint Denys, "in the encounter with the Memiso, several hundred Haitians, although not superior in number to their adversaries, have retreated shamefully, and almost without defending themselves, to their headquarters in Azua. The Dominicans attacked them, it is said, and repulsed them with stones."^[68] It was around April 17, 1844, when Santana received 600 rifles from Saint Thomas and another undetermined number of them from Santo Domingo, "where a large number of firearms in poor condition are deposited that are being repaired without loss of time," information that denotes the urgency in using even rehabilitated weapons.^[69] But the reconstitution of light weapons was not for Santana a viable solution to sustain the fragile Dominican defense. It would be enough for his troops to become "invincible and self-confident," "a reasonable credit, some French officers, a few hundred soldiers and weapons" that France could take from its Antillean possessions, as Saint Denys commented to Guizot on April 23, 1844.^[70]

After his withdrawal from Azua, Santana remained in his camp at Sabana Buey until July, in anticipation of new Haitian incursions. On at least four occasions, since the war was formally declared on April 19, 1844 by the Central Governing Board,(72) he asked it to provide him with rifles and lances in order to undertake new actions. Thus, on May 2, he wrote to Tomás Bobadilla: "See if it is possible to provide us with some rifles, send the Leonor out as soon as possible, and send for more lances, because I have already distributed all those you sent me and I have unarmed people left."(73) On May 9, one day after the fire at Azua on the occasion of Herard's departure, he reconsidered his request for lances and demanded more rifles: "It is essential that you send me provisions with which to maintain ourselves in Azua, where we will find nothing, rifles in the greatest number possible, because from Azua down the lances will be of little use to us, troops with which to reinforce the army and horses, because cavalry is indispensable to me."(74) On May 18, seeing the need to reinforce Commander José Durán, who had marched on the San Juan Valley and was "short of ammunition, weapons and people" to face a Haitian attack, He wrote to Bobadilla: "I leave to your consideration the indispensable nature of providing me with ammunition and food, weapons and money, so that I can do so with the inhabitants of those towns San Juan and Las Matas de Farfán who are already gathered with us."(75)

On May 20, two days later, when Bobadilla himself informed him of the situation of the troops of Commander Fernando Tavera, of Neiba, he reiterated the need to arm the infantry: "the people he commands are all unarmed, because despite finding themselves with a large number of men gathered, it has not been possible for them to continue their march in pursuit of the enemy, having to stop in Neiva, where they hope to be assisted as soon as possible with ammunition and weapons of all kinds, particularly firearms, since they have absolutely none. —Commander Duvergé then tells me that yesterday in Azua he reviewed 356 men who had been gathered to him from the natives of that place, who are, if possible, in worse condition than those of Commander Tavera, in terms of arms and ammunition, not having a single rifle because the enemy disarmed them in their retreat, and in virtue of this I will ask you to send me as soon as possible all the rifles, lances, sabers and ammunition that you can. (76) On that same date, together with his brother Ramón Santana, he desperately cried out to Saint Denys: "since we know that the Central Governing Board through you has made proposals to your government, I make it my duty to beg you to speed up this business as soon as it is in your power."^[71]

Saint Denys did not "speed up" the "business" as Santana asked him to do and as soon as June began, the Central Governing Board called out to Saint Denys for the last time:^[72]

The territory having been invaded by the Haitians, we requested from our representatives in the country assistance in the form of arms, troops, and an open credit to confront such an unjust and horrendous aggression, which has not had any effect to date; and with only our efforts and our own resources, protected by Divine Providence, we have managed to get those oppressors to evacuate it entirely. (…) The conquest of our independence must therefore be considered today as an accomplished fact and our conduct and dispositions are a testimony to our being worthy of it. (…) And in the presence of such circumstances, could not the representatives of His Majesty the King of the French who is on this Island, namely His Excellency Admiral De Moges, Mr. Consul General and Your Excellency, take upon themselves, due to the distance and the urgency, to provisionally recognize Dominican Independence under the political protection of France?

The requests for arms for the defense of the southern border, in the face of French silence, were directed to other territories. On May 7, 1844, the Central Governing Board had commissioned Lieutenant Colonel Juan Nepomuceno Ravelo Reyes to buy arms, ammunition and provisions in Curaçao and Saint Thomas in a ship armed for this purpose,(79) and on an undetermined date, José Díez, as an envoy of the Central Governing Board headed by Duarte's followers, traveled to Venezuela with the same objective, as can be deduced from a letter from Saint Denys to Minister Guizot dated July 1, in which he reported the blow to the corporation presided by Bobadilla on the 9th of the previous month. In that communication reads the following:^[73]

An agent of Duarte has just arrived from Caracas, sent there to request arms and financial aid from the Venezuelan Government. This agent has brought back, after a month and a half of absence, only the paltry sum of twenty doubloons that he was able to gather with great difficulty. This sad result has so impressed the rare and generous supporters of the government that it has opened their eyes.

Without the expected French support, it must be concluded that the first clashes with the Haitians, although they ended in victories, took place under extremely disadvantageous conditions from the point of view of the quantity and suitability of the weapons used, which, however, were handled beneficially. Saint Denys, in a letter to Guizot in May 1844, had not failed to express his astonishment at these triumphs:^[74]

Would one believe in Europe, at such a great distance from the scene of the events, that peasants lacking everything, poorly fed, without discipline, without capable leaders and, so to speak, abandoned only to their own inspirations, could, in such a short time, repel with such great advantages, everywhere they went, an enemy so superior in numbers and resources? Could one believe that the army under the command of General Pierrot disappeared never to appear again, after having left 715 dead and an equal number wounded in Santiago, when this brilliant event only cost the Dominicans the loss of a single man? In the various clashes in the south between the troops of Santana and those of Riviere, the latter suffered considerable losses, while the former lost only three men?

The monetary emissions authorized by the Central Governing Board in July and August 1844(82) provided the public coffers with an exchange agent that facilitated the financing of war expenses. Indeed, Tomás Bobadilla, in his speech before the Constituent Assembly held in San Cristóbal on September 26, pointed out that the government had provided itself with "a large quantity of rifles and other war elements,"(83) although he did not specify the source of supply. Where they were purchased would matter little to France, whose extreme caution clearly did not expect a positive response at the time the purchase was agreed, as indeed it did not happen. Chancellor Guizot, in a discouraging response to Consul Saint Denys in November 1844, said the following:^[75]

The resolution of the King's Government has not changed. It is only important that it be well understood in Santo Domingo. It is not an abandonment, far from it. We wish that the Dominican Republic triumph over the difficulties that surround its birth; we will gladly help in everything that can strengthen it, whether inside or outside, but we believe it is at least useless and in its own interest not to become its protectors.

Having decided that there would be no French armed assistance, a new order for the purchase of weapons was entrusted to José María Caminero, appointed by President Santana as special envoy to the United States government to strengthen relations85 and seek recognition of independence. Caminero traveled in December 1844(86) and returned in June 1845 with John Hogan, commissioned by the State Department to report, among other things, on the number, discipline and equipment of the Dominican troops.(87) According to a letter from E. Billini to Antonio Delfín Madrigal, dated in Santo Domingo on April 20, 1845, Caminero would bring "ten thousand rifles and I do not know how many uniforms for the troops."(88) The Spanish minister in Washington, in a letter to the Secretary of State of his country in June 1845, does not corroborate the number, but did confirm that the Dominican delegate brought with him "a fairly considerable number of rifles and clothing for the troops."(89)

It must be concluded that these rifles - which were allegedly acquired from the government of the American president John Tyler, interested in undermining Haiti, because of the example it meant for the institution of slavery in the southern United States - (90) were intended for the men who saw action on the southern and northern fronts during the second campaign of the war and were to be used in Cachimán, La Estrelleta and Beller. Their supply, as in other cases, was to be made in and from Santo Domingo, as various news reports report. Thus, on March 10, 1845, a company from Cotuí arrived in the capital, under the command of Major José Hernández, and was given 100 rifles; on March 18, Lieutenant Silvestre Espinal took 100 rifles from the capital to La Vega; On April 21, 4 barrels of cannon powder, a box of flint stones, 4 demijohns of cannon powder and 400 rifles were sent to La Vega via Puerto Plata, aboard the schooner La Merced, and on January 19, 1846, a thousand flint stones were sent to La Vega with Lieutenant Colonel José Rafael Gómez.(91)

The pioneering shipment of rifles acquired in the United States must have been followed by others with an equal or greater number of pieces. Manuel Jimenes, Minister of War and Navy of the Santana government, in his report presented in 1846 regarding the work of the portfolio under his charge the previous year, specified that "weapons, a large quantity of war supplies" had been purchased. (92) This assertion is confirmed by the fact that Navy Lieutenant David Dixon Porter, the second special agent sent by the State Department after receiving Hogan's report, (93) noted in his diary in May 1846 that the government had "thirty-five thousand sets of weapons and other war munitions in abundance." (94) This increase in the number of pieces did not, however, banished the use of less advanced weapons: Porter himself refers to boys "from 12 to 13 years old struggling to load a musket almost as heavy as themselves." (95)

As a result of the Hogan and Porter missions, in February 1847, Washington appointed Francis Harrison Pierpont as his commercial agent in Santo Domingo,(96) but beyond that fact, according to American historian Charles C. Tansill, "[t]he outbreak of the Mexican War in May 1846 prevented any further activity with reference to Santo Domingo."(97) It must therefore be thought that this war, which extended until 1848, not only limited the supply of American weapons, but may also have diminished the number of pieces available: in February 1847, in response to the news that the Haitian president Jean-Baptiste Riché was preparing to march towards Dominican territory, the French consul Victor Place reported that a recruitment of 400 or 500 young men, "almost children, ragged and poorly armed", was carried out and sent by sea to Azua, from where they went to San Juan de la Maguana and Las Matas de Farfan.(98)

The appropriation of weapons left on the battlefields by the Haitians, although practiced from the beginning of the war, would then make up for the numerical deficiency of the pieces available in the arsenals. In Las Carreras, for example, "more than a thousand rifles abandoned by the invaders" were collected, (99) manufactured in the same year of 1849 in Saint-Étienne,(100) and which had been acquired by President Faustin Soulouque with the exchange of the Haitian coffee harvest of 1848. (101) Perhaps it was this considerable quantity, which would unleash no small number of quarrels over its possession, which motivated President Manuel Jimenes to decree on April 24 following that "all the manual weapons, knives and firearms, insignia and decorations, saddles and trousseaus taken from the enemy" would be the property of those who had taken them or would take them, while the property of the nation would be "the artillery and supplies, the flags and standards, war chests and fifes, train boxes and utensils attached to them." (102)

After the battle of Las Carreras, Francophile efforts reappeared before the new consul Victor Place, backed by a resolution of the National Congress of April 17, 1849, requesting that the nation be placed under the protection of France.(103) Santana took care of reorganizing the means of defense that were available, although as the French diplomat explained, "unfortunately, most of the rifles that the Dominicans have, bought some time ago from the United States and which were of very poor quality, are completely out of service."^[76] Santana was aware of this reality and in a letter addressed to this official, he stated the following:^[77]

There is only one thing we lack: arms, and we need good ones; and for this I thought I could count on the friendship of France, of that great nation that has declared itself the friend of peoples who know how to fight and perish for their freedom. Therefore I come to beg Your Honor, the Consul, to do us the favor of requesting from us in the way that you think easiest, promptest, and most economical, a first quantity of two thousand French rifles, light infantry, selected and of good quality; of which quantity we wish to obtain 1,700 flintlock rifles and 300 piston rifles, in order to introduce the use of the latter in this country. I also wish to obtain two thousand cartridge belts, of which 300 are of the new model, with a belt to carry in front; and finally, some copies of the regulations on the use of piston rifles.

Consul Place suggested to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the number of rifles and cartridge belts requested by Santana be increased by 4,000,(106) but that approach was also unsuccessful.

The temporary interruption of the United States as a source of supply and the French refusal were no obstacle to national defense being the recipient of most of the State's resources in this period. In that year of 1849, the allocation for the Ministry of War and Navy represented 73% of the total government expenses; in 1846 it had been assigned 85% of the general expenses and in the year of the last Haitian invasion, that allocation was 69%.(107)

In correlation with these figures, in 1848, President Manuel Jimenes demonstrated the strength of the army by proclaiming "if we have executed and obtained all this at a time when we did not have the necessary weapons and equipment for defense, what should we not expect now that we have it";(108) In 1854, General Antonio Abad Alfau, in his report as Minister of War and Navy, reported that in "the arsenals and warehouses there is a considerable stock of weapons and ammunition, as well as artillery, infantry [and] cavalry."(109) The quantity of weapons, however, was practically the same as that available at the time of Porter's mission eight years earlier: William Leslie Cazneau, in a letter dated January 23, 1854 to Secretary Marcy of the State Department, stated: "The Dominican Republic has 30,000 carbines, all purchased from the United States from 1844 until now."(110)

This reality gives allows many to understand a letter dated December 4, 1855, to the political chief of Santiago, ordering him to send the blacksmiths and gunsmiths of La Vega to repair the damaged rifles, (111) as well as a letter dated the 7th of the same month and year from the political governor of Azua, F. Sosa, who required the commander of weapons of Barahona, José Leger, to go to Azua on a ship that would be destined for their transfer, in which, in addition to 50 artillery men, "all the rifles that were in bad condition" were to be transported. (112) Or the claim of Ambrosio Montero to the general in chief of the southern borders also in 1855: "Do not forget that I have three companies and none of them has a box. I need some rifles. Send me some rifle stones with the carrier." (113)

The small number of weapons was joined in specific cases by a limited number of men to carry them, which led to the use of the guerrilla warfare system, (which would be over-dimensioned later in the restoration war against Spain). In Las Carreras in 1849, Santana sent guerrillas to the two wings of the Haitian army "to attack them in the advanced posts, which they had as garrisons in both wings, and achieve by this means, not only to disturb them, but also to warn me of their operations" (114) and in 1855, "hunters and Dajabonese" formed guerrillas that harassed the Haitians in the Northwest Line with such severity that they made them leave their baggage. In this order, in a December 1855 report from the head of the northeastern borders to the military commander of Santiago, the following is expressed: "Today very early in the morning the enemy, harassed by the guerrillas, abandoned the field, retreating with shameful haste, as he was throwing his baggage along the way: the chief who commanded them left even a medal of honor - silver - which is today in the possession of Colonel Valverde, and they have left carbines, pistols, etc. "(115) In short, the Dominican armory park was diminishing in the years following the last campaign of the war of independence until it was minimal at the time of the outbreak of the Dominican Restoration War,(116) but as seen, the effort to have firearms reveals their role in the revolutionary actions and denies the omnipresent character of bladed weapons.

The tactical autonomy of bladed weapons in the War of Independence was subject to various conditions, dependent on the different battlefields and the rules under which their actors operated on them, subordinated, among other things, to the forces and weapons available, the characteristics of the terrain in question and the strategic and/or tactical objectives being pursued, contained globally in the general operations orders(150) that empowered the commanders and in the disposition of the troops that they ordered before entering into combat.(151)

The first circumstance was determined by the decision to use it for the assault of a position after a suitable intervention on it by the artillery and the infantry - which would have undermined the enemy's morale - taking advantage of the moments of reloading of the Haitian musketry, (152) of which several actions are a manifestation. For example, in the battle of Cachimán, on December 4, 1844, General Antonio Duvergé, commander of the expeditionary army of the southern borders, with "a force of about one hundred and fifty infantrymen and seventy cavalrymen," broke the attack with the infantry, but the capture of the fort built by the Haitians in the place, given its topographical and constructive conditions, implied its assault by the Dominican troops. Thus, Duvergé says:(153)

I learned upon my arrival that it was absolutely necessary to take that point, both because of its excellent location and because of the way it was fortified, its entire circumference walled, with no more entrances than three small gates that only allowed the entrance of one man at a time, but confident in the justice of the cause we defended and in the brave men who surrounded me, I arranged to divide them into three columns to attack the fort from three different points. The fire began from all three, but vigorously resisted by the enemy, the victory was indecisive for ten to twelve minutes, but finally the brave soldiers, mixing with the noise of their shots the cheers for the country and for our president Santana, redoubled their ardor, and attacked the fort, which I saw, I ordered the assault, at whose voice the brave men flew and seized the shoulder of the trench. At the same time the enemy jumped over the walls, rushing into a deep ravine, and after twenty-five or thirty minutes the flag of the white cross was seen fluttering over the fortress.

On June 17, 1845, Duvergé stormed four enemy trenches, an action in which the attack was sustained by infantry fire until at a certain point the order was given to assault the Haitian positions with bayonets(154). In this combat it became evident that the effect of fire was not enough to win and that the value of the rifle lay in its affiliation with the bayonet attached to it:(155)

On the 16th the Dominican army left Las Matas and spent the night at the advanced post of Comendador, from where it left the next day at six in the morning in three strong columns: the first under the command of General Alfau, who was to cut off the enemy's retreat; the second under the command of Lieutenant Colonel F. Pimentel, escorting an artillery piece; and the third, which was to attack from the right, with another artillery piece, commanded by General Duvergé in person. At around eight o'clock this last column halted in front of the enemy and formed up for battle, waiting for the column that was to operate behind the enemy, being the one that was to delay its operations the most, to give the signal that it was about to enter, which occurred at ten o'clock, this being the signal for the general attack. The fire began at all three points at once, and after two hours of lively fire, well sustained by the enemy, and in which the three columns in competition performed miracles of valor, they charged with bayonets and completely routed the enemy, dislodging them from four strong entrenchments.

In this battle, as expressed in another communication, the performance of the firearms, before the entry into action of the bladed weapon, was remarkable:(156)

In accordance with the announcement that we gave you in our last letter, we left the town of Las Matas yesterday, the 16th, spent the night in Comendador, and today, between 6 and 7 in the morning, we marched on the enemy in three columns, and between 9 and 10 in the morning, each of the said columns having arrived at its respective position, we gave the signal for assault, and after two hours of vigorous resistance on the part of the enemy, who was positioned in four different trenches that also followed one another as if they were inaccessible ascents, the flag of the Dominican Cross was planted in all of them, in a complete victory on the part of our men and in which the enemy was completely defeated, and in fulfillment of our duty we must recommend to you the army in general, because it would be difficult for us to say with justice who behaved better in this action. We cannot at this time give you certain news of the large number of deaths, because they are appearing more and more in the mountains, where the fire was bloody.

In the battle of Beller, on October 27, 1845, the strategy of General Francisco Antonio Salcedo, commander in chief of the northeastern borders and political chief of the province of Santiago, was also to consecutively confront the enemy with rifle fire and after this, take his position with knives: (157)

(…) we had barely appeared in the clear savannah of Beler, when we perceived that the enemy was positioned at the height of Coco de Beler, where they had a perfectly built castle, walled and ditched, two pieces of artillery, and a large garrison under the command of Colonel Seraphin. I was going through the different columns giving my orders, after having recommended to General Imbert the inspection of the army, when upon reaching the column on the left, our troops shouted “Long live the Dominican Republic! Long live General Salcedo!” And as soon as this long live was heard, the enemy opened fire, firing a 12-pounder culverin at the same place where I was. I gave the order to attack and after an unstoppable fire of an hour and a half and tenacious resistance on the part of the enemy, we entered the said castle, sabre in hand, and a few moments later the standard of the Dominican Cross was seen waving in the same place where the enemy flag was, leaving in the fort and its enclosure more than three hundred and fifty enemy corpses, victims of our lances and machetes, plus ten prisoners, some of them seriously wounded and who are in this canton.

In that battle, the charge on Beller Castle was also accompanied by artillery, according to an eyewitness: (158)

At seven in the morning, when our troops faced each other in the spacious field of Beler, the Haitian artillery, with accurate shots, decimated our men, but they answered with their three pieces and advanced at a charging pace towards the fort, despite the heavy ground, which due to the rain of the previous day made the artillery difficult to roll, they dominated those fires, and at twelve o'clock, the Invincible was in the hands of our men (…).

In the action of El Número, on April 17, 1849, the short distance at the most compromised moment of the advance towards the Haitian positions determined that this was the propitious occasion for the white weapons, without the support of the artillery, but with previous discharges of rifle fire, to be established as elemental, as can be seen in the description made by the French consul Victor Place referring to Santana's role:(159)

In two days he was able to gather between 700 and 800 men, with whom he decided to take decisive action. Indeed, the next day, at the head of this small troop, without artillery, he resolutely attacked the Haitians who were commanded by President Soulouque himself, whom he had entrenched in a small, almost inaccessible place, protected by five pieces of cannon. For almost half an hour the Haitian artillery fired constantly, but every time they perceived the flame, their soldiers threw themselves to the ground and immediately got up to continue running their route. When they were only a few steps from the enemy, the Dominicans fired at point-blank range and, abandoning their rifles, threw themselves into the trenches, wounding with blows from lances and machetes, those long sabres with which they defended themselves with wonderful skill. It seems that this hand-to-hand combat, similar to those of the Middle Ages, was a real carnage. (…) President Soulouque himself shouted "every man for himself", so the entire army took refuge in Azua, abandoning its artillery, as well as a large number of its horses and cattle.

At Las Carreras, on April 21, 1849, the bladed weapon was essential for the capture of the Haitian artillery, thus dismantling the main force of this troop in the attack on the Dominican divisions, as Santana wrote to the Minister of War and Navy:(160)

After about an hour of such unequal combat, our troops, with their worthy leaders at the head, charged the enemy artillery and, taking hold of their knives, seized it at the same time that I arrived with the cavalry, which was under the command of Colonel Pascual Ferrer.

At Santomé, on December 22, 1855, a knife counterattack followed the musket fire, according to an account by Marcos Antonio Cabral regarding the troops under the command of General José María Cabral:(161)

The Dominican army, kneeling on the ground, salutes the Haitian army with a shower of fire; the straw of the savannah lights up by chance or on purpose and the wind throws smoke and flames on the Haitian army. (…) The standard-bearer of the Bani flag, Hipólito Caro, runs, rushes in front of Cabral and plants his flag almost among the enemies themselves; the battalion rushes after his flag, and the entire army, as if moved by a spring, comes out of the forest, enters the hot ashes of the burning straw and throws itself upon the Haitians like a legion of demons. The Haitian troops retreat at the first push, but they rally and fight again; But the Dominicans, who have more confidence in the edge of their machetes than in the bullets of their rifles, always advance, with the purpose of entering with knives and sowing terror into the enemy ranks, which they achieved very little, cutting short Haitian lives with the terrible blow of their steel. The Haitians tried to resist the furious force with which they were attacked, but it was impossible, because everything there was confusion, destruction, blood and death, until finally the Haitian army, completely mutilated, scattered in all directions, followed by the Dominican army at a very short distance, because fatigue prevented them from going any further in the pursuit.

In Sabana Larga, in 1856, the bladed weapon was used once the Haitian troops were diminished by the musketry: (162)

Although the enemy attacked our left flank and the front, on both sides they were completely beaten, defeated and pursued in flight, after a sustained fire from seven thirty until four in the afternoon, leaving the field strewn with enemy corpses from Sabana Larga to the savannah of Dajabón, in such great numbers that it seems impossible to count them.

In the report of that battle, the last of the War of Independence, it is stated that "the enemy had to retreat because of the deadly fire of our carbines" after the attack on the Dominican left flank column, as well as after two battles against the right flank column of our army; the attack on the Haitian rearguard was led by General Fernando Valerio, who "brave as his sword, has behaved in an admirable manner, since he always went ahead killing Haitians.(163)

Valerio, "due to fighting, his campaign saber was broken; for which and for his merits in it he deserved from the Government a saber of honor and to be elevated to the rank of Major General."(164) On the southern border, the already noted sequential pattern of rifle fire and the use of knives was made evident, as it appears in the report sent to the Minister of War about a confrontation at the siege of El Puerto against a Haitian force towards the first days of February 1856: "In El Puerto he tried to fight, confident in the superiority that the nature of his position gave him over ours, but after a short shootout, our soldiers assaulted him, and the Haitians again began to flee."(165)

A second opportunity for the use of the bladed weapon was manifested in the occasion of its effectiveness against the firepower of the Haitian infantry at a given moment. In this regard, in the report of Lieutenant Colonel José Tomás Ramírez, commander of the outposts of La Caleta and Colorado, to Colonel Remigio del Castillo, commander of the Neiba borders, on a battle in Loma de los Pinos, dated in La Caleta on July 5, 1845, the following is read:(166)

Colonel: As soon as the reinforcement of troops that you sent me arrived at this post under the orders of Captains Dionisio Reyes, Mariano del Castillo and Ignacio de la Cueba, I gathered them together with one of the companies under my command, I placed myself at their head and we marched against the enemy, who were camped on Loma de los Pinos, on the ground of which they had strong entrenchments. As soon as they sighted us they began to fire at us, and although we fired eight or nine volleys at them, seeing that their trenches prevented us from doing them the damage we desired, I gave the order to assault, and Captains Mariano del Castillo and Dionisio Reyes advanced, with sabre in hand, and were the first to open a breach in the enemy fort through the fire. They were followed by Marcos Mercedes, José María Aibar, Celedonio del Castillo and Pedro de Sena, whom I point out as the first, since all the others did their duty and conducted themselves in such a way that in a moment they defeated the enemy, causing great loss.

However, in this case, the use of the bladed weapon was subsequent to the demonstration of the infantry's firepower, as specified in another report from Colonel Ramírez sent to his superior on the following July 13:(167)

As soon as the reinforcements you sent me arrived, I arranged to scout out Los Pinos, led by Captain Marcos de Medina. On the hilltop they encountered the enemy, and after a battle in which the fire lasted about a quarter of an hour, our men took up their lances and, attacking hard, the flag of the Cross triumphed, leaving eighteen dead on the field and some seriously wounded, without us having suffered any misfortune.

A third circumstance of its use was the possibility of an attack on enemy artillery which was in turn protected by the fire of the infantry of a corps of our army. In the report of the Battle of Estrelleta, dated at the headquarters of Las Matas on September 17, 1845, addressed by General José Joaquín Puello to President Santana, this form of confrontation is set forth:(168)

I had our army divided into two divisions, the right wing forming six battalions under the command of Colonels Bernardino Pérez and Valentín Alcántara, which I detached along the Los Jobos road to occupy the Bánica road. The division that formed the left wing, also composed of 6 battalions and whose command I reserved for myself, headed along the royal road that goes to Comendador. Upon reaching the heights of Mata-Yaya we perceived the enemy on the opposite bank of the river, and militarily positioned in a range of hills situated in the Estrelleta savannah, its only two entrances covered by two pieces of artillery, and a piece of cavalry advanced, quite far from its general canton. "They immediately sighted the column under my command, sounded the general's call and prepared to wait for us. I answered with our battery and prepared to go into action, which was all I wanted, waiting only for the right wing to give the agreed signal. In fact, a quarter of an hour after my arrival, the right wing opened fire, at 8 o'clock in the morning, and the column under my command, flying with lightning speed, launched itself upon the enemy, mocking their bullets and shrapnel. In an instant they took possession of the artillery pieces and broke the enemy division. The left wing did the same, and after 2 hours of lively combat we defeated the Haitians (...).

In the Battle of Estrelleta, a Haitian cavalry attack was repelled at bayonet point with a square of infantry, the only occasion on which such a defensive formation was put into practice, (169) evidence of the degree of knowledge of military tactics by the officers of the Dominican army.(170)

A fourth situation in which the use of the bladed weapon was convenient was the possibility of surprising even a single man. The account of the Haitian historian Justin Bouzon on the defense of the Haitian artillery Battery in the Battle of Las Carreras is an example of this circumstance:(171)

General Luis Michel found himself abandoned by his soldiers at one point: a cannon was about to fall into the hands of the enemy (…) he dismounted from his horse and, with one of his guides, tried to save the piece (…) The guide was killed, a Dominican was seizing the piece: the general left him lying with a pistol shot. A second Dominican got down to take hold of the cannon rope, and never got up again. Having discharged his two pistols, General Luis Michel unsheathed his sabre and defended the piece. A pile of corpses served as a trench (…) the Dominicans were amazed at such courage. They shouted to the general to surrender and save his life (…) A lance stabbed him in the forehead. With the back of his gloved left hand he wiped away the blood that was blinding him. (…) Weakened by his wounds, blinded by the blood that was pouring from his forehead, he nevertheless remained standing, defending his small body from the enemy who tried to surround him. Finally he received a blow from a lance in the middle of the chest, collapsed, and fell hugging the cannon that he wanted, alive, not to leave the Dominicans.

A fifth opportunity would be determined by the Haitian retreat, at which time the Dominican action was better served by having troops mobilized on favorable terrain. An illustrative episode of this possibility was witnessed by Eugenio Almonte, a participant in the Battle of Cambronal in 1855: "It was about two in the afternoon: seeing the first Haitian lines attacked by the Dominicans with machetes, they began to retreat; and such was the confusion due to the narrowness of the terrain that in the end their retreat became a complete flight."(172) The terror that "the Dominican lances" instilled in Haitian President Philippe Guerrier, to which E. Billini referred in a letter of 1845(173) and the disappearance of the Haitians before the arrival of "lances, machetes and knives with abandonment of fire", to which President Manuel Jimenes alluded in 1848,(174) was instrumentalized in 1856 by Dominican Vice President Manuel de Regla Mota as a manifestation of heavenly protection: "Dominicans: Union, firmness and confidence in Providence, and we will bequeath to our children a name full of glory, and a Homeland rescued from Haitian barbarism, with the tips of our lances."(175)

And José María Cabral, in a speech given in honor of Santana in Las Matas de Farfán on January 25, 1856, attributed his performance to an unknown aid: "Never would that presumptuous man who calls himself Emperor have managed to "level us" with his slaves, because while they take one step forward they retreat two, intimidated by the heroic courage of our soldiers and the edge of our steel swords, which merge with each other and devour them, despite all that might oppose them. Our weapons, illustrious liberator, accustomed to victory, as you yourself have felt, helped as always by a secret way that directs the destinies of our country, will always put an end to the wavering Haitian empire. (176)

The resonance of the bladed weapons even reached echoes in the Antilles. Soto Jiménez cites a publication that appeared in the Gazette of the Turks Islands on November 19, 1846, in which the following question was asked: "What fruit have the Haitians obtained from taking the bordering possessions? The Dominicans have taken them all by force of the lance and the machete?"(177) As can be seen from the comparison of the reports, communications and testimonies referred to above, firearms were the primary instruments of the Dominicans, despite the confidence they had in machetes. The essentiality of the use of the rifle or carbine in the engagement of a battle is confirmed by the documents cited above, which establish that the rifle fire was what broke the Chief's prudent attacks, because the Dominicans were superior in war every time they used said weapons, the enemies experiencing greater damage, and the Treasury saving the expense of gunpowder and bullets. (178)

A letter dated March 5, 1849 from the then Minister of War and Navy, Román Franco Bidó, to the political chief of Santiago, shows that the use of bladed weapons was based on the sense of opportunity: "The use of the saber and the lance will not cease to be preferred, whenever the prudence of the Chief so judges, because the Dominicans are superior in war every time they make use of said weapons, the enemies experiencing greater damage, and the Treasury saving the expense of gunpowder and bullets."(178)

Franco Bidó's observation was not new. Combat in the 1840s was not very different from the way of waging war that had prevailed for more than a hundred years(179) and that would remain practically the same, with very slight changes, until the arrival of the World War I.(180) Indeed, as far back as 1756, the rule for the use of the knife by the Rogers Rangers, an unconventional warfare unit of the British Army in North America created by Major Robert Rogers, enshrined the following: "XIII: In general when you are attacked by the enemy, maintain your fire until you are very close, at which time the enemy will cause much surprise and consternation and will give you an opportunity to fall upon them with your axes and sabres for a better advantage."(181)

A tactical observation similar to that of Franco Bidó would be made years later by an anonymous army officer in a letter dated December 26, 1855, which appeared in the newspaper El Dominicano. While noting that, even without discipline, soldiers performed "prodigies of valor" with a sabre in hand, he noted in a clear-sighted manner: "it would be good to instruct some battalions with all the rules of military art and war for the future; "The machete and the lance do not always find the opportunity to do the good work that the rifle does in guerrillas, columns or compact masses."(182) The superiority that Franco Bidó and this unknown officer referred to was complementary to the participation, in the first moments, of the artillery and the infantry in the different battles, and as seen in the reports and testimonies transcribed above, was based on the fact that the Haitians did not repel - exceptionally - the Dominican charges either with rifle fire or with hand-to-hand combat with knives; rather they became disorganized and retreated due to the brutality of the attack and the impression caused by seeing a mass of men advance at the greatest possible speed and even if not on horseback, who, after firing with their rifles, would throw themselves on top of them with lances and machetes to execute what Soto Jiménez calls the coup de coteau or knife blow:(183)(184)

The machete-wielder, as infantryman or cavalry dragoon, rifleman in the early stages of any combat or lancer on horseback, arrived at the supreme moment of the use of the machete, when the short distance gave rise to hand-to-hand combat, almost always facing the bayonet, which, regardless of the skills of the expert in its effective es grima, so popular in North America and Europe, always came out badly against the attack of the Dominican encabao. The initial blows of the encabao were always aimed at mutilating the arms or hands that held the musket or rifle at that moment (…).

The culminating contribution to the victories explains why Franco Bidó placed the importance of the bladed weapons above the role of the riflemen and the artillerymen, soldiers and officers who interacted in the handling of an artillery piece.(185) Thus, in a statement of May 4, 1849, he surrounded them with a divine chant: "Dominicans, Providence protects us, luck turned its back on you for a few days to test your courage, and again grants you the favors of victory, and the Haitians flee to their homes, torn apart by the lances and machetes of our brave Dominicans (...)".(186)

The use of bladed weapons after artillery fire and in parallel or consecutively with rifle volleys reveals the tactical teachings received by citizens from the eastern part of the island who did their compulsory military service during Haitian domination and who later joined the ranks of the nascent Dominican army. The War of Independence, Soto Jiménez argues in this regard, was not "an improvised war, much less one waged by improvisers"; the soldiers were not "and the officers who commanded them were, in their overwhelming majority, either professional soldiers or had significant military training." But for this author, Dominican tactics dated back to the 16th century: "The military technique that achieved and sustained Independence in the prolonged war of Separation was a military technique refined by more than three hundred years of experience and which already had, by that date, countless great achievements, feats and memorable military victories, to which we owed our survival as a people and our social and cultural formation."(187)

The above is justified with three key arguments: “both the organization and the tactical doctrine of war were aged [sic] like wine over time, not in a regular military institution that as such served as a stable receptacle, but preserved intact within the people and their needs”; “the men had been through most of the variables that were presented later and most of the theaters of war had been repeated scenes of military actions by the Dominicans;(188) and the soldier who fought in the Separation spent more than three centuries training live and his qualities and war skills were passed from father to son as the machete, the saddle, the pigs and the conuco were inherited.”(189)

Also taken into account is the fact that between one generation and another has been set at 25 years, starting from the last great war on the island - the Battle of Sebana Real in 1691 - a total of four generations of Creoles, born respectively in 1716, 1741, 1766 and 1791 - before the birth of Pedro Santana (1801) and the Battle of Palo Hincado (1809) - used the machete and the lance for a hundred years as agricultural and livestock tools and not with a defensive sense. And as the aforementioned Méndez Amaro acutely observes, more than three decades had passed between the War of Reconquista and the Dominican War of Independence and, therefore, that "doctrine of war" to which Soto Jiménez refers, despite its tradition, had not had a continuous practical accompaniment. (190)

Despite the significance that the war has played in leading to the successfully establishment of the Dominican Republic, this topic became a subject of controversy. One particular subject of scrutiny pointed out by critics is the fact that this event, which is celebrated as a national holiday, celebrates the Dominican Republic's emancipation not from a European power, but from another former colony, Haiti. In fact, Dominican Republic is the only nation in the Caribbean that gained (one of) its independence from another Caribbean nation. (Although, in the Latin American basin, nations such as Uraguay and Panama attained their independences from Brazil and Colombia, respectively). In contemparary times, this event would often be mentioned unfavorably by critics, especially in comparison to the Dominican Restoration War, its successor conflict. One of the questions in permanent debate among Dominican social science researchers is whether the Restoration war against Spain, which waged between 1863 and 1865, was actually the "true" Dominican independence.^[78] Some scholars believe that anti-Haitian sentiment had some influence over this.

Puerto Rican independence advocate, Eugenio María de Hostos, influenced by positivism, valued August 16, 1863 more than February 27, 1844, since on that date the country showed the highest degree of patriotic consciousness. “Military, politically, socially, August 16" – he said – "corresponds in the life of this nation to efforts, materials, purpose, national and national evolution that February 27 did not require.” Pedro Henríquez Ureña, for his part, speaks of “our process of moral independence,” which began with that of Núñez de Cáceres in 1821, “not clearly conceived, perhaps, but independence nonetheless,” continued in 1844, growing and defined by its founders, but not for the entire people (...) and concluded in 1873 (November 25), when the people overthrew Báez and with it not only their purpose of annexing us to the United States, but the entire idea of annexation. On that date the process of national understanding reached its climax.^[79]

After these three stages of national historical development, the Dominican people have always been present every time it has been necessary to defend national sovereignty, as occurred in the Dominican Restoration War (1863-1865), in the Six Years' War (1868-1874), in the nationalist resistance during the first American occupation (1916-1924) and finally during the Dominican Revolution of 1965.

Throughout the course of 12 years, Dominican independence fighters had to fend off four separate military campaigns by invading Haitian armies, spawning a total of 14 bloody battles both on land and at sea. Below consist of the following major confrontations:

• France–Spain relations
• Dominican Republic–Haiti relations
• Dominican Republic–Haiti border
• Peace of Ryswick
• Treaty of Aranjuez (1777)
• Hispaniola

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• Doce batallas militares que consolidaron la Independencia Nacional
• Dominican War of Independence