A memory war is a political dispute over the interpretation or memorialization of a historical event. It is applied especially to disputes in Central and Eastern Europe over the interpretation of World War II.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]

A 1997 article in the Journal of the Early Republic—which focuses on the United States history from 1776 to 1861—used the term "memory wars" in its examination of the capture and subsequent execution of British Major John André.[9]
In her 2005 article for Central European History, historian Mary Nolan identified a marked shift in German public discourse since 2002 from a focus on German guilt to a growing emphasis on German suffering, especially regarding the civilian experience of the Allied air war. Nolan argued that this renewed attention to German victimhood represents a collective preoccupation within German society and is indicative of an ongoing "memory war," in which competing narratives about the nation's past are actively contested.[7]
Sociologist Stanley Cohen (sociologist)'s main message in his 2001 Index on Censorship article "Memory wars and peace commissions" is that confronting past atrocities through peace commissions and truth-telling is complicated by competing narratives, selective memory, and denial. Cohen argues that legal and institutional solutions are often insufficient for true reconciliation due to conflicting versions of history and emotional resistance. He notes scholarly interest in the late 1990s and early 2000s stems from the challenge of transitional justice—how democratizing societies address crimes by prior regimes—and from questions about "collective memory," including whether societies remember or forget the past like individuals do, and how memory can be shaped by both democratic participation and state-organized "memory work" such as memorials and ceremonies.[12]

2025年のニューヨーク・タイムズの記事とブルッキングス研究所の学者による分析によると、中国とロシアの大規模な軍事パレードは、軍事力と国家の誇りの誇示以上の意味を持ち、進行中の「記憶戦争」における戦略的ツールでもある。[ 13 ]タイムズの記事は、習近平、ウラジーミル・プーチン、ナレンドラ・モディを含む10人の国家元首が中国の天津に集まった2025年9月の上海協力機構(SCO)の会合に言及している。中国とロシアは、このようなイベントを通じて、連合国の勝利という西側の物語(多くの場合、米国と西ヨーロッパの貢献を中心とした物語)に異議を唱える第二次世界大戦の歴史の代替バージョンを推進している。これらの好ましい歴史的記憶は、ファシズム打倒における中国とソ連の犠牲と役割を強調し、現代の領土的および戦略的主張を正当化し、カイロ宣言やポツダム宣言のような合意に基づく「戦後国際秩序」という彼らのビジョンを提唱するなど、いくつかの目的を果たしている。このようにして、公的な記念行事は地政学的対立の手段として動員され、国際的な認識を形成し、国民的アイデンティティを強化する。[ 14 ]